



CONFIDENTIAL.

(5664.)

F.O.

407

PART XXV.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF EGYPT.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Egypt.

PART XXV.

No. 1.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 133.)

My Lord

Cairo, March 20, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from Mr. Consul Cameron respecting the rebel movements at Suakin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Consul Cameron to Sir E. Baring.

(Telegraphic.)

Suakin, March 19, 1888.

HEAD Sheikh and Southern Hadendowas, being recalled to Kassala, fear Abyssinia. Digna lost very heavily on 4th March; also shown great cruelty certain Hadendowa Sheikhs. Many local Hadendowas leaving him. He is collecting more Northern Amarars and men from Tokar.

No. 2.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 136.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 23, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a telegram which I have received from Mr. Consul Cameron on the subject of trade between Suakin, Rowaya, and Berber.

The news contained in this telegram requires confirmation before it can be implicitly trusted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Consul Cameron to Sir E. Baring.

(Telegraphic.)

Suakin, March 22, 1888.

INDIAN merchant, Gholam Fugoo, reports road clear Rowaya, Ariab, Berber. Berber quiet, and people on road willing to trade. Also, Mahdi said to be in favour of peace security roads.

No. 3.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 138. Secret.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 24, 1888.

ONE of the numerous difficulties connected with the Government of Egypt consists in the fact, that few facilities exist for obtaining accurate information as regards the state of public feeling in the country districts. I am able, both from personal observation and from conversations with others, to form a tolerably accurate idea of the state of native opinion in the towns. This class of opinion is, perhaps, from a political point of view, more important than any other. It is, however, largely influenced by the views entertained both by Europeans and by the upper classes of natives, who, as your Lordship is aware, are for the most part Turks, Syrians, Armenians, &c.

Outside this portion of society lies the mass of the Egyptian population who live in the provinces. It is very difficult to arrive at any true conception of the views current amongst the masses. In the first place, the fellaheen are very reticent and timid. In the second place, frequent conversations with persons in authority in Cairo have convinced me that the members of the Government, especially Nubar Pasha, are themselves very imperfectly informed of the views and aspirations of the people in general. In the third place, great jealousy has always been shown at any attempt to obtain information through trustworthy European sources of the true state of affairs in the provinces. The desire to confine English influence and English sources of information to the towns was one of the reasons which induced Nubar Pasha to object so strongly to European police inspection.

Few Europeans have such good opportunities of gauging provincial opinion as the English officers of the Irrigation Department. They are constantly travelling about. In the course of their professional duties they are brought into frequent contact with the small village proprietors. They speak Arabic. They inspire confidence among the people. A short time ago I had an interesting conversation with Mr. Foster, one of the most able of Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff's officers. I asked him to put down on paper, for my confidential information, the impressions which he had formed as to the opinions generally entertained by the fellaheen. I have now the honour to inclose a copy of a very interesting letter I have received from Mr. Foster.

Mr. Foster's Report is generally in harmony with the information I have received from other trustworthy sources. It confirms the views which, from time to time, I have had the honour to submit to your Lordship.

I do not think that Mr. Foster exaggerates the "strong dislike, amounting to hatred," entertained by the fellaheen towards the Pasha class.

I believe also that Mr. Foster's statement, to the effect that "the spirit of resistance against oppression, set alive by Arabi, is stronger now than ever," is quite accurate.

Your Lordship will observe that Mr. Foster goes so far as to say that "the Pasha rule would never last, supposing England were to withdraw from Egypt. . . . The fellaheen have learnt the meaning of the word 'liberty' to such good purpose, that anything approaching a despotic rule would cause a rising amongst them."

That the ultimate effect of the withdrawal of the British garrison and the diminution of British influence would be to cause great discontent I do not for one moment doubt. But whether that discontent would culminate in a popular revolution, or whether—supposing the Government to be strong enough to strike terror—the people would, with characteristic Oriental fatalism, regard bad government much in the same way as they would regard taxes and cholera—that is to say, as one of the necessary evils of life, and thus tacitly acquiesce in the inevitable—is a point on which it is very

difficult to hazard a conjecture. In my belief, the chances are that an upset would take place, but it is impossible to foresee whether it would take the form of a Palace intrigue, a military mutiny, a popular revolution, &c.

When Mr. Foster says that "one of the most powerful and most disliked of Pashas is said to be of Jewish descent," he alludes to Riaz Pasha.

As regards the sentiments entertained towards the British soldiers, all I have heard leads me to confirm the accuracy of Mr. Foster's views. The Mahomedans sometimes rather despise our soldiers, because they occasionally see a man intoxicated in the streets. But the two points which strike them most are (1) that they pay for everything they consume, and (2) that they respect the women of the country. In these matters their conduct is in singular contrast to that of the French at the end of the last century, whose behaviour is still remembered by tradition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Mr. Foster to Sir E. Baring.

Alexandria, March 21, 1888.

Dear Sir E. Baring,

SOME time ago, you asked me to note down my impressions as to the state of feeling existing among the fellaheen. I must premise by apologizing for having delayed so long in carrying out your wishes, and trust you will be good enough to forgive me the delay.

I have invariably found the fellah, whether poor or rich, to entertain a strong dislike, amounting to hatred, for the Pasha or ruling class, and, quite irrespective of religion, the Mahomedans being equally odious as the Christians.

It is quite sufficient that a man is a Turk, or that he is in any way connected with the Turkish Government, to make him abhorred by the Egyptian fellah. Armenians, Syrians, Circassians, and Jews, are all hated as well as the Turk himself. I think it would be difficult to discover which particular race is most hated, but I fancy that the Jew or Armenian would take the palm. I mention Jews, because one of the most powerful and most disliked Pashas is said to be of Jewish descent. He is spoken of by many as a Jew, and always in terms of disgust.

I believe of European nations, the French are disliked only less than the Greeks. The fellah knows the history of the French invasion at the end of the last century, and the belief is, that should they ever regain supremacy in this country, their rule would be marked with the same outrages, the accounts of which, from having been handed down from father to son, have become more like stories of ogres and such like.

It would be too much to say that the English are liked, but I believe they are respected on account of the consideration shown to their religion and harems, of both which they are exceedingly jealous.

I have heard more than one man say that the behaviour of our troops after Tel-el-Kebir was a matter of great astonishment throughout the country, for they had expected to see enacted the same horrors which they believed to have been perpetrated at the time of the French invasion.

The majority of the fellaheen I have come across understand the effect of English control, namely, the freeing them from oppression. The word liberty is constantly in their mouths. There doubtless are a large number of the poor in remote districts who have not yet come to understand the good that is being done, but they will soon hear of it, for the word "liberty" is travelling fast.

To the initiated, it means that Pashas can no longer force them to labour in their fields without payment, that they get their fair share of water, that their complaints receive equal attention, and that they are not called on to pay more than their legal taxes.

The spirit of resistance against oppression, set alive by Arabi, is, I believe, stronger now than ever. The Pasha rule would never last, supposing England were to withdraw from Egypt. The fellah is a long-suffering fellow, and possibly things would go quietly for a few months, but ultimately, and at no great period, there would be a rebellion. Their dislike to Pasha rule is so great, that the very smallest matter would irritate them—even laws, which, had they been made under English control, would have been quietly accepted, would, when made by the Pasha, be resented, and considered cause

for grievance. The fellaheen have learnt the meaning of the word "liberty" to such good purpose, that anything approaching a despotic rule would cause a rising among them.

Of what the Pashas themselves would do should they regain power I cannot, of course, venture an opinion; but the fellaheen believe that they, the Pashas, would endeavour to revenge themselves for the loss of power and money sustained during the period of English intervention by resorting to the old system of oppression, especially in the matter of *corvée*.

The fellaheen invariably acknowledge their inability to govern themselves, and that a Government of Omdchs and Sheikhs would be as unacceptable as the Pashas. Sheikhs are a very ignorant lot, despotic and unjust.

It will be many years before the fellaheen will be able to understand and appreciate a representative Government. All he asks for now is to be left in peace, with sufficient water and not too heavy taxes.

These, Sir E. Baring, are my impressions of the feeling among the fellaheen in Egypt, the result of four years constant intercourse with them.

I trust I have not trespassed too long on your valuable time, and remain, &c.
(Signed) E. W. P. FOSTER.

No. 4.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 139. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 24, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a letter I have received from Sir F. Grenfell, dwelling on the military importance of Suakin.

Colonel Kitchener spoke to me on this subject when he was in Cairo. It seems that an idea got abroad at Suakin that it was the intention of the Egyptian Government to abandon Suakin, in the sense of allowing the place to fall into the hands of Osman Digna and his followers. I have explained to Sir F. Grenfell and Colonel Kitchener that nothing of the kind was ever intended. The town of Suakin is easy to hold by a small military and naval force. Apart from other considerations, it is to be observed that the capture of the place by the dervishes would materially increase the difficulties which the Egyptian Government now has to encounter in the Nile Valley. The only change which has ever been seriously discussed here is the possibility of handing back Suakin to the Sultan. There is a good deal to be said in favour of this proposal; but, for a variety of reasons into which I need not now enter, I regard it as improbable that practical effect will ever be given to this plan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Major-General Grenfell to Sir E. Baring.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Head-quarters, Egyptian Army, March 19, 1888.

THE responsibility and the expenditure incurred by the occupation of Suakin by the Egyptian Government have attracted of late so much attention without, it would seem, the reason for the retention of this station from a military point of view being given due prominence, that I venture to address a few words to your Excellency on the subject.

2. Leaving on one side the question of Suakin as a centre from which to restrain the Slave Trade, judged on military grounds, this position is of great importance as covering the right or east flank of any force holding the Southern Egyptian frontier—that is, the force now garrisoning Assouan, Halfa, and the intermediate stations.

3. With Suakin and the tribes in its neighbourhood on their flank and rear, the rebels of the Soudan are chary of coming north of the line of wells on the Abu-Hamid and Korosko route.

The town at present gives a *point d'appui* to those holding out for, or coming over to, Government; and, were Suakin no longer held for the Egyptian Government, the tribes now friendly to us (which now include several important clans of the Hadendowa and the warlike and influential tribe of the Bishareen), no longer having the

courtenance and support of Government, nor having any longer a place from which to draw their grain and find a market for their sheep and cattle, would be forced to make common cause with the dervishes.

4. The excitement which a small frontier raid always causes in Upper Egypt is out of all proportion to the real importance of the occurrence.

Thus, during the past month the appearance of a hundred marauders on the river between Korosko and Halfa caused movement and uneasiness at Keneh, 300 miles north, so much so, that a force has been for the past month kept in readiness to move to Keneh in case any further unfavourable symptoms showed themselves.

5. Were Suakin to be given up, it would be at once necessary to garrison Keneh permanently, and, possibly, Kosseir, organizing an effective system of posts and patrols between these two points, while it might be necessary to increase the garrisons of Assouan and Korosko.

Any economy in the actual administration of the Red Sea Littoral would be thus more than swallowed up, while we should probably have to deal with disturbances in Upper Egypt (where their effect would be infinitely more serious), instead of dealing with them at a distance at Suakin and on the frontier, where their influence is comparatively little felt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. GRENFELL, *Sirdar.*

No. 5.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 24, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which, in compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 33 of the 20th instant, I addressed to Nubar Pasha on the subject of the application of the press laws in Egypt to foreigners.

A copy of his Excellency's reply is also inclosed herewith, from which your Lordship will see that the necessary authorization will shortly be given for the issue of an edition of the "Egyptian Gazette" in the Arabic language.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Sir E. Baring to Nubar Pasha.

M. le Président,

Cairo, March 21, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I duly transmitted to the Foreign Office, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of your Excellency's note of the 23rd ultimo respecting the application of the press laws in Egypt to foreigners.

I am now instructed by Lord Salisbury to state, in answer to questions which your Excellency addressed to me, that in principle Her Majesty's Government reserve all their rights on the issues raised, and cannot surrender them until other nations do the same. In practice, however, Her Majesty's Government are willing to consider British subjects bound to obey the press laws, and will throw no obstacle in the way of their execution by the Egyptian Government. Should any unforeseen reason render it, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, necessary to fall back on our full rights, I will not fail to give the Government of His Highness ample notice of the intention to do so.

Such being the decision of my Government, I trust that your Excellency will see no objection to granting permission to the Editor of the "Egyptian Gazette" for the issue of an edition of his newspaper in the Arabic language.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Nubar Pasha to Sir E. Baring.

M. le Ministre,

Le Caire, le 24 Mars, 1888.

EN réponse à ma lettre du 23 Février dernier, vous voulez bien me faire connaître, par votre dépêche du 21 Mars, l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté relativement au droit du Gouvernement de Son Altesse d'appliquer aux étrangers les lois régissant la presse en Egypte.

En vous accusant réception de cette communication, pour laquelle je vous prie, M. le Ministre, de vouloir bien faire agréer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté les remerciements du Gouvernement de Son Altesse, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que j'ai écrit à mon collègue de l'Intérieur afin qu'il autorise Mr. Philip, Directeur de "l'Egyptian Gazette," à publier une édition de ce journal en langue Arabe.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,
(Signé) N. NUBAR.

No. 6.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

Sir,

Admiralty, March 28, 1888.

I AM commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter, dated the 9th instant, received from Commander Neville, of Her Majesty's ship "Dolphin," reporting the state of affairs at Suakin subsequent to his previous Report of the 2nd March.

I am, &c.

(Signed) R. D. AWDRY.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Commander Neville to Admiral His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

Sir,

"Dolphin," at Suakin, March 9, 1888.

ON Sunday, the 4th, the enemy began firing between midnight and 1 A.M., and kept it up at intervals till daylight. When the cavalry picket went out they discovered that the enemy had occupied the disused position called Fort Hudson, situated about 1,100 yards from the redoubt, the nearest fortification. Numbers of the enemy could be seen scattered in the distance gradually advancing. About 9 A.M. I received a message from Colonel Shakespeare, asking me to open fire when I saw an opportunity. We fired our first shot at 9:30.

At 10 A.M. the Egyptian troops advanced to endeavour to drive the rebels out of Fort Hudson, but were not successful, the position being too strong; whilst retreating the enemy charged, during which Colonel Tapp and 5 men were killed and 17 wounded: the enemy suffered severely, and retreated again to their former position, which they held all day. The "Albacore" fired 23 rounds during the day, this ship 10, at distances varying from 2,700 to 4,000 yards.

The Egyptians kept up a continual fire from their Krupp guns and Gardner's with considerable effect. The fire from the ships was also very effective.

All firing ceased at midnight, and in the morning there was no sign of the enemy. Judging from the number of new graves discovered they must have lost considerably.

Two of the Egyptian wounded have since died, making a total of 9 killed.

Everything has been quiet since.

The following have been the movements of foreign ships of war:—

The Italian dispatch-vessel "Colonna," Commander Annovazzi, left Massowah on the 7th, arriving here the 8th, to see if the Italian Consul required assistance in consequence of the attack on Sunday last. She leaves in two or three days for Massowah.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. NEVILLE.

No. 7.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir W. White.

E

(No. 100.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 3, 1888.

THE Turkish Ambassador informed me to-day that the Sultan was much preoccupied with the state of things in Egypt, and was anxious to bring to an end a condition of affairs which was not, in his judgment, consistent with his own dignity as Head of the Mussulman religion.

I stated to his Excellency that in respect to policy our position was exactly what it was last year; that we were anxious, whenever we did leave Egypt, to leave it in a condition, both as regards finance and public order, which should give sufficient promise of stability and security, but especially we required that in any Agreement we might enter into with His Majesty there should be provisions which would secure the Egyptians, after our departure, against the danger either of internal disturbance or external attack.

I said, however, that, in one respect, our position was different from that which we occupied last year. After the experience we had undergone, we should look on any renewed negotiations with some apprehension lest they should result in exposing us to a diplomatic disappointment which a Power like England does not readily incur.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 8.

Sir E. Malet to the Marquis of Salisbury — (Received April 4, 5:30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, April 4, 1888, 4:40 P.M.

COUNT BISMARCK tells me that Signor Crispi has told the German Ambassador at Rome that the Italian troops could not be withdrawn to Cyprus even if the offer were made. He would have to bring them back to Italy if they cannot be admitted to Egypt.

Count Bismarck still hopes that your Lordship will find it possible to let them come to Egypt, merely allowing it to be used temporarily as a sanatorium on the score of humanity.

The Negus has refused Italian proposals, and has gone away, but the Italian General has sent a messenger after him with fresh proposals.

Even if peace should be concluded, and question of going to Egypt consequently cease, Count Bismarck says that the consent of your Lordship would go far to keep Signor Crispi in the right path, about which he seems to have some anxiety.

No. 9.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(Most Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1888, 10:15 A.M.

THE Italians are pressing very hard to be allowed to encamp their Abyssinian troops in Egypt during the summer in case they do not come to terms with the Negus.

Do you see any objection to the proposal? If there is no spare barrack room they will house themselves.

No. 10.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 5, 5:30 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 5, 1888, 3:45 P.M.

WITH every desire to meet wishes of Italian Government, I think it impossible to do what they ask.

It is quite out of the question that their troops should come to Cairo or Alexandria; a most serious question would necessarily be raised with French. Further, all

the local international sentiment, which is particularly strong between French and Italians, would be stirred up, and I should fear considerable difficulties in consequence. Feeling between our troops and the Italians would probably be very friendly, but most awkward situations might arise through the indiscretion of individuals of either nationality.

To land them at Suez would not be quite so objectionable, but is also most inadvisable. It appears to me contrary to the spirit of the Convention now being negotiated; also it would be most dangerous precedent. How could we on future occasion object to French landing a force upon some pretext on its way to Tonquin? Could the troops not be sent to Cyprus? Or, if they do not wish to go so far, could they not be encamped at the pilgrim quarantine station at Tor? I do not know if there is a sufficient water supply there, but could inquire, if necessary.

Or, could they not go to Suakin? I cannot say how the Egyptian Government would take this proposal. Probably they would not like it, and the Sultan would, of course, cry out. But I do not think we need much mind this.

No. 11.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 6, 10 A.M.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 6, 1888, 9 A.M.

OFFICER commanding at Korosko reports the receipt of letters from Slatin, Ohrwalder, Lupton, and two others. Slatin has received 70l. and Ohrwalder 100l. All express wish for more money, and trust in messenger.

I have asked for further information.

No. 12.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received by telegraph, April 6.)

(No. 151. Ext. 74.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 6, 1888.

I HAVE this day had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph that the officer commanding at Korosko reports the receipt of letters from Slatin, Ohrwalder, Lupton, and two others. Slatin has received 70l. and Ohrwalder 100l. They all express a wish for more money and their trust in the messenger.

I have requested that I may be further informed of the contents of the letters when they arrive in Cairo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 13.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet.

(No. 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 6, 1888, 6.45 P.M.

YOUR private telegram of the 4th.

Baring reports impossibility of assenting to Italian proposal about Egypt, in which I quite agree. The Suez Canal Convention would of itself preclude it. You may offer Aden, which, though hot, is healthy and much nearer.

I have informed Hatzfeldt.

No. 14.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 7, 1888.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from

the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean respecting the withdrawal of Her Majesty's ship "Racer" from the Red Sea, together with copy of their Lordships' reply.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Admiral His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.)

Malta, April 6, 1888.

"RACER'S" crew much debilitated. Propose to withdraw her from the Red Sea. Senior Officer reports there is no occasion for three ships at Suakin.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

Admiralty to Admiral His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

(Telegraphic.)

Admiralty, April 6, 1888.

YOUR telegram of to-day's date approved.

No. 15.

Sir E. Malet to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 8, 3.15 P.M.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, April 8, 1888, 1.30 P.M.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 22 of the 6th instant.

Count Bismarck informs me that he has communicated to Italian Government your Lordship's offer of Aden, but has not as yet had any reply.

No. 16.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 142.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 30, 1888.

A COMPLAINT having reached me from traders at Suakin with regard to the regulation in force there that all applications to the Government Office for the export of goods out of the town should be made on stamped paper of the value of 3 piastres, I took the opportunity of Colonel Kitchener's recent visit to Cairo to speak to him on the subject.

Colonel Kitchener now informs me by letter that he has decided to abolish all applications to the Government Office for passing out goods by sea, and that only a notice (not on stamped paper) will be required from merchants passing out of the town gate.

I have the honour to inclose herewith copy of the notice to this effect issued by Colonel Kitchener.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Notice.

ON and after the 22nd March merchants exporting goods by sea can go direct to Custom-house, without previous formality, clearing their goods according to Custom-house Regulations.

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Those desirous of passing out of the town gate should previously send a notice, not on stamped paper, to the Government Office, in order that proper pass for the gate may be prepared.

Suakin, March 21, 1888.

No. 17.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 143.)

My Lord,

Cairo, March 31, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a note,* by Sir Colin Scott Moncrieff, on the Nile flood of 1887. This flood was not so high as that either of 1874 or 1878, but it may be considered one of quite exceptional magnitude. No engineering records of previous floods have been preserved, and to the want of such records were due many of the difficulties with which the Irrigation Officers had to contend last summer. The inclosed account has been compiled with great care, and will, no doubt, prove very useful on future occasions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 18.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 11, 9 A.M.)

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 11, 1888.

I HAVE just received a message from the Grand Vizier that the French Ambassador has just communicated a telegram, emanating from the French Consul at Massowah, stating that the Italians are about to dispatch 8,000 men of their expeditionary corps to Suez to spend the summer there under General Saletta.

The Sultan is, I hear, greatly concerned at this piece of news. His Imperial Majesty hopes that Her Majesty's Government would not sanction such a proceeding, on which he says he could not look with indifference, and would be compelled to take measures.

(Sent to Sir E. Baring.)

No. 19.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir W. White.

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 11, 1888, 1.10 P.M.

YOUR telegram No. 37.

No intelligence has reached us of such an intention on the part of the Italians, and we do not believe it.

(Sent to Sir E. Baring.)

No. 20.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 12, 3.5 P.M.)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 12, 1888, 1.20 P.M.

MY telegram No. 37 of the 10th.

Count de Montebello has just been to see me. From his conversation I gather that the information given by his Excellency at the Palace is not borne out by subsequent telegrams received by him.

Sultan was, I understand, considerably relieved by my communicating at the Palace yesterday evening, through Sir A. Sandison, the substance of your Lordship's telegram No. 60 to me, as this was the first contradiction of the misleading statement.

(Sent to Sir E. Baring.)

* Not printed.

No. 21.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 13, 5.35 P.M.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 13, 1888, 3.50 P.M.

MY telegrams Nos. 38 and 39 of the 10th and 12th instant.

I am told by the Grand Vizier that when Count de Montebello communicated to the Porte and at Palace the news derived from the French Consul at Massowah, his Excellency inquired what Turkey proposed doing, and offering the support of France. Porte appears to have now the impression that there was some such intention on the part of Italy of moving troops to Suez, but that it has been abandoned owing to the objections entertained to such a scheme by Her Majesty's Government. Count de Montebello stated this at the Porte yesterday, and the Turkish Ambassador telegraphed from Rome a similar allegation from hearsay.

Should this last statement prove as incorrect as the previous one, it would only be fresh evidence of the desire of the French Embassy to work on the Sultan's mind so as to favour its own influence at the expense of other Powers.

No. 22.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 93.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 13, 1888.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 142 of the 30th ultimo, reporting that the Regulations affecting the export trade at Suakin have been modified and relaxed with a view to meet the wishes of the local merchants.

I have to express my satisfaction at Colonel Kitchener's action in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 23.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir J. Savile.

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 13, 1888.

THE Italian Chargé d'Affaires informed me to-day that his Government have authorized their Agent at Cairo to agree to a proposal which has been recently made that the taxes now paid voluntarily by residents at Alexandria and applied to the maintenance and lighting of the public streets, shall be made obligatory from the 15th instant to the 31st December next, pending the definitive creation of a Municipality for that town.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 24.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received April 14.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 13, 1888.

I AM commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the following extract of a letter, dated the 21st ultimo, addressed to the Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean by Commander Neville, of Her Majesty's ship "Dolphin," viz.:—

"Colonel Kitchener returned on the 18th instant. A few of the enemy's cavalry came within range of the forts on the morning of the 18th instant, a deserter having come in during the night with the information that a reinforcement under a Sheikh of some importance, named Abu Girgeh (who has been Emir of Kassala for some time), is coming from Kassala, on the arrival of which Osman Digna intends attacking the town, an operation in which, in my opinion, he cannot possibly be successful, as he has

only one gun (with a very limited amount of ammunition), which would soon be silenced even without the aid of the ships.

"Everything is now quite tranquil, no movements on the part of the enemy being probable for some time."

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

No. 25.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir W. White.

(No. 61. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 14, 1888, 3.35 P.M.

YOUR telegram No. 39.

There were some suggestions to this effect on the part of Italian and German Governments, but they were discouraged by Her Majesty's Government and never assumed a definite shape.

No. 26.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 147.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 4, 1888.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 84 of the 23rd February last, I have the honour to state that several difficulties having been raised with regard to the settlement of the question of the Alexandria Municipality, it seems probable that a considerable time will elapse before the matter is definitely settled. As, however, the voluntary taxes now paid at Alexandria expired on the 15th ultimo, it became necessary for the Egyptian Government to provide at once for the expenditure, such as paving the streets, &c., which has heretofore been met in part from the voluntary taxes.

With this object in view a Circular, copy of which is inclosed herewith, has been addressed by Nubar Pasha to the Representatives of the different Powers, asking them to consent to the issue of a Khedivial Decree giving legal sanction, up to the end of the present year, to the voluntary taxes now paid in Alexandria.

This Decree, of which a copy is also inclosed herewith, provides that from the 15th of this month until the 31st December next a supplementary tax of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. will be levied on imports and exports, as well as a tax of 1 per cent. on house property. (The figure of 1 per cent. given in my former despatch should have been $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.)

At a meeting of the Consuls-General a few days ago this new proposal was discussed, with the result that it was decided to refer the matter to the consideration of the respective Governments.

Some of the Consuls-General are prepared to signify the acceptance of the draft Decree in question at once. Others have referred to their respective Governments for instructions. I understand that all are prepared to recommend approval of the Decree.

Acting on the approval of my views in this matter, as contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 71 of the 15th ultimo, I have ventured to inform Nubar Pasha that Her Majesty's Government accept the proposal now made by the Egyptian Government. The matter being pressing, I thought it unnecessary to refer to your Lordship for further instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 26.

Nubar Pasha to Sir E. Baring.

(Circular.)

M. le Ministre,

Le Caire, le 4 Avril, 1888.

J'AI l'honneur de vous envoyer ci-inclus le projet de Décret élaboré à la suite de l'accord intervenu entre la Délégation du Corps Diplomatique et Consulaire et le Gouvernement de Son Altesse.

En vous priant de vouloir bien obtenir le consentement de votre Gouvernement pour

ce projet provisoire, fait en vue de parvenir à l'établissement définitif d'une Municipalité à Alexandrie, je saisis, &c.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères,
(Signé) NUBAR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 26.

Draft Decree.

NOUS, Khédive d'Égypte,

Considérant qu'il importe de pourvoir aux dépenses des services dont la Commission d'Édilité d'Alexandrie était chargée jusqu'à la constitution définitive de la Commission Municipale ;

Vu l'assentiment des Puissances ;

Décrétons :—

Article 1^{er}. A partir du 15 Avril, 1888, et jusqu'au 31 Décembre de la même année, il sera perçu et versé à la Caisse de la Commission d'Édilité :—

1. Un droit supplémentaire de $\frac{1}{2}$ pour cent sur la valeur des importations et des exportations à la Douane d'Alexandrie.

2. Un droit additionnel de 1 pour cent sur la valeur locative des immeubles bâtis de la ville d'Alexandrie, telle qu'elle est établie par les rôles actuels.

Art. 2. Les taxes ci-dessus seront perçues par l'Administration des Douanes et par la Daïra Baladiéh respectivement, en ce qui concerne ces Administrations, dans les mêmes formes et sous le bénéfice des mêmes Règlements que les autres taxes de l'État.

Art. 3. Notre Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret.
Le Caire, le 2 Avril, 1888.

No. 27.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 5, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the Sirdar, announcing the resignation by Colonel Hallam Parr, on the ground of ill-health, of his appointment as Adjutant-General and Second in Command of the Egyptian army. General Grenfell incloses a copy of the Special Army Orders, in which he pays a well-deserved tribute to the valuable services rendered by Colonel Parr to the Egyptian army.

The terms in which this officer is spoken of are entirely merited. Colonel Parr, during his five years' service with the Khedive's army, has done much for its efficiency, and has greatly contributed to the promotion of good-feeling between the English officers and their Egyptian comrades.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

General Sir F. Grenfell to Sir E. Baring.

Cairo, April 5, 1888.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Colonel Henry Hallam Parr, C.M.G., A.D.C., Somerset Light Infantry, has been obliged, on account of ill-health, to resign his appointment as Adjutant-General and Second in Command of the Egyptian Army.

Colonel Parr has been granted the leave of absence to which his contract with the Egyptian Government entitles him, viz., three-and-a-half months from the 6th April, 1888, to the 19th July, 1888, when he will be struck off the strength of the Egyptian army.

I have the honour to inclose an Army Order, which I have issued, detailing his services, which have been of the greatest value to the Egyptian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. GRENFELL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 27.

Special Army Orders.

LEAVE of absence on private affairs has been granted to El Sewa Parr Pasha, C.M.G., A.D.C., Adjutant-General Egyptian army, from the 6th April, 1888, to the 19th July, 1888, pending retirement from his Highness' service.

In announcing to the army the resignation of Parr Pasha, after five years' service in the Egyptian army, the Sirdar expresses his deep thanks to Parr Pasha for the untiring energy and unselfish devotion to duty, which have resulted in the steady progress of efficiency in the Egyptian army during the time he has held the position of Adjutant-General and Second in Command of the army.

While maintaining strict discipline, Parr Pasha has devoted himself to the improvement in the position of the officers and men of the army.

The organization of head-quarters.

The improvement in the position of "disponibilité" officers.

The Military Pension Law.

The further advancement of education in the military schools are all due to his exertions.

In saying good-bye to Parr Pasha, the Sirdar wishes him all success in his future career; and he is confident that the whole army joins him in the hope that at some future time, with health restored, Parr Pasha may again re-enter the service of His Highness the Khedive.

By order,
(Signed) J. OWEN QUIRK, Kk., A.A.G.
(For Adjutant-General).

War Office, Cairo, April 3, 1888.

No. 28.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 98.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, April 17, 1888.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 147 of the 4th instant, and have to state that I approve your having notified to Nubar Pasha that Her Majesty's Government are prepared to assent to the issue of a Khedivial Decree giving legal sanction up to the end of the present year to the voluntary taxes now levied in Alexandria for the maintenance and lighting of the public streets.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 29.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 99.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, April 20, 1888.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 150 of the 5th instant, announcing the resignation by Colonel Hallam Parr, on the ground of ill-health, of his appointment as Adjutant-General and second in command of the Egyptian army.

I shall have great pleasure in communicating to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for War the testimony borne by you and by Sir F. Grenfell to the value of Colonel Hallam Parr's services.

I wish to add to that testimony the expression of my own regret at Colonel Hallam Parr's resignation, and for the circumstance which has occasioned it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 30.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 156. Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 16, 1888.

My Lord,

I CONVEYED to your Lordship in three successive telegrams, dated the 10th, 12th, and 13th instant, the particulars of an incident which has caused considerable sensation, but only in a very limited circle, as up to the present moment it has not transpired generally, and has been successfully kept out of the press.

This incident had reference to an alleged shipment at Massowah of Italian troops for Suez, the news of which had greatly disturbed the Sultan's mind.

On the 10th instant His Imperial Majesty was giving an official dinner to M. de Radowitz on the occasion of his Excellency presenting his new credentials, when Count Jaroszynski, the First Secretary of the French Embassy, arrived at the Palace and insisted on seeing Munir Pasha, the Principal Master of Ceremonies, and on conveying through him a message to the Sultan from his own Ambassador.

This message consisted in a repetition of the information received by the French Government from their Consul at Massowah, according to which 8,000 Italian troops were about to embark from thence for Suez, and the first party was to sail under General Saletta on the 13th instant.

The French Ambassador was, it appears, desirous to learn what steps the Porte was going to adopt in consequence, and had been instructed to offer the Sultan and his Government French support; but this did not transpire till some days later.

The first part of the above message was at once conveyed to me by the orders of the Grand Vizier by Artin Effendi, the Secretary of State, who was dispatched from the Palace for that purpose, where he had come by Imperial command as a guest to the State banquet, but had to go home to take off his uniform, and reached this Embassy at 7.30 P.M., and then went with a similar communication to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires.

Before his Excellency could return to the Palace M. de Radowitz had said much to dispel the alarms of the Sultan.

In delivering his message to me Artin Effendi had expressed His Imperial Majesty's hopes that Her Majesty's Government would not sanction any such proceeding on the part of the Italians on which, he added, the Sultan could not look with indifference, whilst to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires the phrase "Que Sa Majesté ne pourrait pas supporter" was employed.

I promised his Excellency to convey the whole of his message to your Lordship, and asked him to assure the Sultan that I could give His Majesty no information whatever, as I was entirely ignorant of what can have given rise to allegations of which I heard for the very first time.

On the 11th instant, about 5 P.M., I received a telegram from your Lordship, the contents of which were conveyed to the Palace by Sir Alfred Sandison, and I learnt that His Imperial Majesty was gratified at receiving thus the first contradiction, which had been the occasion of so much uneasiness.

For my part, I am disposed to think that the way in which the French offer of assistance was brought before the Sultan contributed quite as much to disturb His Majesty as the alleged facts.

On the morning of the 12th instant Count Montebello called upon me and admitted that the first impression of the news he had received and conveyed had been qualified considerably by subsequent telegrams.

Some persons continue to maintain that the Italians actually entertained some such intention of sending troops to Suez, but were discouraged in this plan by your Lordship, but it would be useless to pursue these observations, as from what I can gather this incident may be considered as closed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 158.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 12, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to state that on receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 61 of the 7th ultimo, I forwarded to Colonel Kitchener a copy of Count Károlyi's Memorandum relative to the adoption of measures for the release of the European prisoners still detained in the Soudan, and requested him to favour me with his observations upon it.

I now beg to inclose copy of the reply which I have received from Colonel Kitchener.

Colonel Kitchener, as your Lordship will see, is of opinion that the means of escape from Khartoum at the present moment are, owing to the dangers of the road and the unsettled state of Berber, rendered extremely difficult, and that it is more prudent for Lupton and Slatin to defer for a time making any such attempt.

The letters from these and other prisoners, which I mentioned in my despatch No. 151 of the 6th instant as having been received at Korosko, have not yet reached Cairo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 31.

Colonel Kitchener to Sir E. Baring.

Sir,

Suakin, March 31, 1888.

IN reply to your despatch of the 16th instant, forwarding to me a Confidential Memorandum addressed to Lord Salisbury by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and requesting my remarks on the points mentioned therein, I have the honour to forward to you the following observations upon the various points raised:—

1. Although large rewards have been specially offered for the release of Slatin and Lupton, I have also made every effort for the liberation of the nuns and missionaries now kept prisoners at Omdurman, and have given every assistance in my power to others, such as Mgr. Sogaro, who were also doing what they could in that direction.

After M. Locatelli escaped, a caravan of goods was organized here for the relief of the Mission. These goods were subsequently lost owing to M. Locatelli not being able to proceed as he had proposed.

I have told almost every trader that has ventured from here into the Soudan, that if he could bring out any European he would be well rewarded, and that it would be a passport with me that he was really anxious to serve the Government, as well as that it would be considered by me as a personal obligation which I would repay by every means in my power. Traders have in consequence frequently brought back Egyptian refugees, hoping they were the right people.

When Mgr. Sogaro was here recently, we discussed what further steps could be taken, and agreed that, owing to the political aspect of affairs here, it would be more advisable to wait for some time.

I feel sure, from the tenour of the instructions I have received from time to time, that Her Majesty's Government, as well as the Government of Egypt, is most anxious to help in the release of all European prisoners now detained in the Soudan.

2. My reason for mentioning an attempt at direct communication with the Khalifa Abdullah was due to the fact, that my original letter to him was well received, and resulted in increased freedom being given to the prisoners. M. Locatelli was present when the letter was read by the Khalifa in Omdurman, and profited by the new regulations to effect his escape.

I think that it requires some caution in the composition of the letter, as such communications may possibly do more harm than good. I am prepared to send a further letter on the subject should Her Majesty's Government think it advisable.

3. It is well known here that liberal rewards will be given for the release of any European. Large rewards have been offered for Slatin and Lupton without effect, but this result may be owing to their not wishing to risk a journey which would doubtless be most dangerous for them.

I do not, however, consider that the publication of such rewards tends towards increasing the chance of delivering the captives, for the news naturally travels to Omdurman, and fresh restrictions are imposed, and greater care consequently taken in guarding the prisoners.

Should a missionary or nun be released, those that bring them should be at once well rewarded, and for this purpose Government assistance might be required.

4. The recent engagement at Handoub does not in the least affect the situation. The following are the three principal causes that make present relief specially difficult, viz.:—

1. Osman Digna's force established at Handoub, blockading this town from the interior.

2. The Italian war with Abyssinia, and the hostilities between the latter and the dervishes at Galabat.

3. The dervish force at Sarras and Abu-Hamed, blockading the Nile route.

The best outlets now left for escape are, in my opinion, Akik and Rowayah. I have informed all loyal tribes that I consider it part of their duty to assist in every way in their power the escape of refugees, and they have promised to do so.

I attach a Statement of later information that I have received on the subject of refugees. I have recently been in communication with Mdlle. Slatin, who lives in Vienna, and have sent her the original of her brother's letter, as well as forwarding letters from her to Slatin Bey.

In my opinion, the dangers of the road are just now very great for any one attempting to escape from Khartoum. When M. Locatelli escaped Berber was quiet, and I had fairly good relations with the Ruler there, and the road between here and Berber was then practically safe. Neither of these conditions now exists, and, though the captives in Omdurman are, doubtless, undergoing some of the worst forms of hardship and privation, still their lives are in practical safety, and by patiently waiting, even at the cost of prolonging their sufferings, they may eventually be able to effect their escape with far greater security than at present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. H. KITCHENER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 31.

Reports concerning Slatin and Lupton Beys and other Europeans now Captive at Khartoum.

ON the 21th October, 1887, Mustafa Mohammed, a Garaib, arrived from Khartoum. He had been sent up by the Governor-General about the end of July to bring information with regard to the meeting of the Mahdist Ameers, then about to take place, and also to communicate with the European captives there. He reached Khartoum about the end of August, and contrived, by the aid of Aly Wad Saad, the newly-appointed Ameer of Berber, to meet Slatin Bey in secret. He informed him that there were English in Suakin, and that the Government had offered 1,300 dollars for his liberation. When he asked him to try and escape, Slatin replied that he could not do so just then, as any such attempt would cause the Khalifa to revenge himself upon the other Europeans in Khartoum. He said that he would, however, endeavour to be sent out upon one of the numerous expeditions from Khartoum, and, while away, would arrange with the Sub-Ameer of Berber to have Mustafa Mohammed sent to him, and he would then endeavour to escape to Suakin. On this understanding they parted, Slatin giving the reporter a letter from the Governor-General. This is written on a small piece of paper, and is as follows:—

"Excellence,

"Mustafa vous donnera mes nouvelles. Donnez baksheesh à lui (sic).

(Signé) "RUDOLPH."

On the 20th November, 1887, Mohammed Wad Hamad Shankat, a native of Suakin, arrived from Khartoum with letters from Lupton Bey to the Governor-General and Brewster Bey. He was sent up from Suakin in July 1887 to try and effect the escape of Lupton Bey. On arriving at Khartoum he had to wait thirty-five days before he could communicate with him unobserved, but eventually contrived to do so, and advanced Lupton 58 dollars, as the latter was very hardly off for money, and owed a good deal, and owing to this he said it was impossible to escape just then,

as he was closely watched. Lupton at first objected to writing, but after Mohammed had advanced him the money he consented, and gave him the above-mentioned letters. The former is as follows.—

"His Excellency General Kitchener,

"I am well. Please do all you can for Mohammed Hamad. He will, with your assistance, get me away from here. Do everything in secret; there are many spies among you."

Lupton, who gave the messenger a receipt for the money advanced, told him to return and ask for 200*l.*, with which he was to buy two good dromedaries, fully equipped, and arms. These were to be taken to Khartoum via Berber, and when everything was ready the messenger was to inform Lupton. Mohammed left Khartoum on the 31st October.

Towards the end of November 1887 Osman Aly, a Massayah Amarar, was sent by the Governor-General from Suakin to Khartoum with 100 dollars for Lupton Bey. He also took with him 100 dollars from the Central African Mission, Suakin, for the nuns and missionaries captive in Khartoum. He delivered the money, but neither Lupton nor the nuns would give him a receipt. They said they were so closely watched that they could not venture to commit themselves to writing.

Osman Aly left Khartoum on the 3rd January, 1888, and arrived in Suakin on the 28th January.

No. 32.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 159. Secret.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 11, 1888.

MR. BOYLE told me a few days ago that he had had a conversation with some students of the El-Azhar University, who took him for a Turk. Mr. Boyle's knowledge of Turkish and Arabic, and his thorough acquaintance with Mahomedan customs and habits of thought, afford him opportunities which are possessed by few Europeans of discovering the true state of opinion amongst the classes of whom these students may be considered as representatives. I therefore asked him to write me a Memorandum on the subject, which is, I think, of sufficient interest to justify my forwarding it for your Lordship's perusal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 32

Note on Native Feeling among Religious Students in Cairo.

(Confidential)

HAVING occasion yesterday evening to be in the neighbourhood of the El-Azhar Mosque, the centre of religious and fanatic feeling in Egypt, I entered a small café, in which were several groups of "mujavreen" (students resident in the University itself) and other persons of the class who frequent, as teachers, "muezzins," &c., the principal mosques of the quarter. As I happened to be wearing a "tarbush," and was in company with a well-known Sheikh, and as I did not consider myself called upon to undeceive my companions as to my nationality, no objection was made, after the customary salutations had been exchanged, to my joining one of the groups.

The conversation was on the favourite topic of these classes of the population, namely, the foreign occupation of Egypt, the relations between the English authorities and the Turkish and Egyptian Governments, and the results of Christian interference with a Mahomedan Government.

The name "students," as applied to the "mujavins" of El-Azhar, is a somewhat misleading one. The University contains at present about 10,000 pupils, resident and non-resident, with 300 Professors. Children of 5 years old pass the whole day laboriously copying verses of the Koran on sheets of tin, while close beside them men of 40 or 50 note down a lecture on astronomy as understood by the Moors in Spain, or an intricate commentary on a disputed interpretation of the Koran. In the great class-hall

the Professors sit on a matting at the base of a column, while their pupils sit round in a circle. The student may wander from one class to another as he chooses, there being no regulation of any kind as to dividing the lessons. The course of studies is extremely limited in scope. The Koran, with its endless commentaries, the traditions of the Prophet and the first Caliphs, Arabic grammar and syntax, some mathematics, and the books of the sacred law, are the sole subjects allowed. There are many men now in the University who have followed these studies for thirty years, and have no idea of changing their mode of life. The great mosque provides ample space for their dwelling and sleeping room, a modicum of bread is given by "Wakf" bequest to each student, or rather to every Mussulman who is within the walls at certain hours of the day. As well as being an university the mosque is also a refuge. Each Mussulman people has its division. Turks, Algerians, Mograbis, Tunisians, and Zanzibaris will find a place set apart for and occupied by their countrymen.

Besides the fanatical sentiment with which this celebrated mosque inspires its inhabitants, the place teems with superstition. It is the favourite haunt of spirits, good and evil, who on certain nights become visible to the believers; Sheikhs and Imams of past centuries deliver ghostly lectures from their old columns, and on the eve of an impending danger to the faith solemn warning is given from the pulpit.

It is hardly to be expected that men whose whole life is passed in an atmosphere of this kind over studies tending to exalt the Moslem and depreciate the Christian should be very enthusiastic in praise of a Christian occupation of their country, no matter how gently and even beneficially exercised. The virtues of the "jihad," or holy war, and the recompense which awaits those who die in its cause, are still preached to willing ears every day in El-Azhar. But, in Egypt at least, those teachings seem to have lost their old power of rousing popular feeling to any great extent—at all events while the external influences continue as at present; and they are now, moreover, only delivered as lessons from books, not as extempore sermons from Sheikhs revered for sanctity.

One of the students in whose conversation I took part yesterday, a man of about 50, drew a lengthy comparison, somewhat to the disparagement of his own countrymen, between the "Softas" (religious students of Constantinople) and their brethren in Cairo, inferring that the former would make the task of occupation a much more difficult and dangerous one than the English, and the French before them, have found it in Cairo. This idea did not, however, meet with a favourable reception by the others, who were all of opinion that, even supposing such a thing to be desirable, it would be idle to talk of a "jihad" in the city while garrisoned by foreign troops, and containing so many discordant elements among the Moslem population itself. For example, the little sympathy which exists between the blacks and the pure Egyptians, and again between these latter and the immigrants from North Africa. The friendly terms on which the leaders of native religious opinion are with the British Representative, as evidenced by their frequent mutual visits, was also alluded to in such a manner as to show that the idea of such an intimacy no longer shocks even the most devout Mussulman of the Cairo school.

I have almost invariably found that the conclusion to be drawn from conversation with Egyptian Arabs who are not in a position which causes them to be animated by any foreign, and hence anti-English, sympathies, is distinctly favourable to the English cause in Cairo. Rarely stirring beyond the precincts of their mosque, and centuries behind the age in all that is not connected with their faith and its laws, they cannot be expected to have large or very intelligible views, even regarding a question which is of such immediate importance to them as that of the English occupation. Nevertheless, the view of such men, valueless as it may seem to some Europeans, is of the last importance in the composition of native opinion. Hundreds of these students leave the mosque yearly, and are scattered through the provinces as village schoolmasters, Imams, and in other similar posts, whence they disseminate the opinions formed at El-Azhar to the fellah population, who receive their utterances with high respect and implicit credence. The influence of the University thus reacts on the whole country. At the present moment that influence seems to tend in a satisfactory direction. The notorious failure of Tigrane Pasha's mission—which was regarded by all this class of men as a personal attack, such as is seen every day in the East, by Nubar Pasha against Sir E. Baring—the growing confidence felt throughout the country in the English Government, its will and power to mete out justice to all classes, and a conviction, strengthened each day by some new proof, that the sacred tradition went too far in declaring that "no real good, temporal or eternal, can come to the Moslem from the hand of the unbeliever"—all these points, to which allusion was made either

directly or indirectly in the conversation which has led me to put down these few notes, would encourage the hope that some progress is being made towards mitigating the bitter prejudice formerly universal among the native religious classes against the Christian stranger.

Though religious feeling is undoubtedly as strong as ever in Cairo, its fanatical display is manifestly on the wane. The "Santons," privileged and almost revered religious monomaniacs, have totally disappeared from the streets of Cairo. Since the murder of Kléber by Suliman of Aleppo, no violent act whose motive could unmistakably be traced to fanatic sources is recorded as having taken place in the city. At the most holy ceremonies of the faith the European officers in the Egyptian service can assist without calling forth any noticeable hostile remark on the part of the spectators.

The French, under Menon, professed Islamism, and purposely defiled the El-Azhar; the English have professed nothing but their own creed, and have rigidly respected every Mussulman institution and prejudice. During the French occupation the Sheikhs of El-Azhar had to concert almost every day measures of self-preservation against death or exile. Under Turkish predominance their doors were perpetually besieged by fellaheen overtaxed and overworked in corvées beyond endurance. At present they deliver their lectures and read the public prayers undisturbed either by oppressors or by suppliants. And as the El-Azhar student is well read in the past history of his country, and far from blind to his own present interest, these differences do not escape him, and hence springs, as already mentioned, a wide-spreading disposition in favour of English rule.

I should add that many conversations with natives in Cairo have led me to the conclusion that there is much dislike and mistrust of Nubar Pasha, whose nationality, in the first place, and his peculiar want of tact in dealing with the sensitive Mussulman hierarchy, in the second place, conspire to give him an unpopularity which seems to be on the increase, so much so, indeed, that the natives of the class of which I have been speaking will, if possible, avoid paying him even the accustomed visits of ceremony.

(Signed) H. BOYLE.

Cairo, April 12, 1888.

No. 33.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received April 24.)

Sir,

Treasury Chambers, April 23, 1888.

I AM directed by the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State, that they have considered your letter of the 10th December last on the subject of the advances made from Imperial funds on behalf of Lupton Bey.

You state that the total sum so advanced amounts to 600*l.*, and that a further sum of 200*l.* had been promised in return for the delivery of Lupton Bey safe at any Egyptian port.

Sir E. Baring reports that the Egyptian Government acknowledged that they owed Lupton Bey 600*l.* on account of salary in November last.

My Lords note with satisfaction that the English General in command had been informed that no further advances were to be made on account of Lupton Bey.

The Secretary of State proposes that Her Majesty's Government should bear finally the charge of the 600*l.* already advanced, but should notify to the Egyptian Government that any further expenditure must be borne by the Egyptian Exchequer.

My Lords would, however, point out that the advances already made, or the greater part of them, have not been made in connection with Lupton Bey's release, and would appear, therefore, to be properly chargeable against his accruing salary.

My Lords would submit that the Egyptian Government should be asked to hand over to Her Majesty's Government the 600*l.* which they admit to be due to Lupton Bey, in order that it may be held against the advance which Her Majesty's Government has made, pending a settlement to be made upon Lupton Bey's release.

This deposit would be made only in respect of the sum which the Egyptian Government admit to be due to Lupton Bey, and without prejudice to other claims, if any such exist, on his part.

I am, &c.
(Signed) W. L. JACKSON.

No. 34.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)

Sir,

War Office, April 27, 1888.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, transmitting copy of a despatch from Sir E. Baring, showing that he, in common with the Khedive, Nubar Pasha, and Sir F. Grenfell, deprecates the withdrawal from the Egyptian army of those British officers who have completed five years' service with that force.

In reply, I am to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, as the Marquis of Salisbury concurs in Sir E. Baring's views, and recommends them for favourable consideration, Mr. Secretary Stanhope will not object to these officers having their period of service in the Egyptian army renewed, but considers that ten years should be the limit of service not to be exceeded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RALPH THOMPSON.

No. 35.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 161.)

My Lord,

Cairo, April 17, 1888.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 147 of the 4th instant, I have now the honour to transmit a copy of the Decree which has been published in the "Journal Officiel" with reference to the continuance of the taxes heretofore voluntarily paid at Alexandria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 35.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of April 16, 1888.

Décret.

NOUS, Khédive d'Égypte,

Considérant qu'il importe de pourvoir aux dépenses des services dont la Commission d'Édilité d'Alexandrie était chargée jusqu'à la constitution définitive de la Commission Municipale;

Vu l'assentiment des Puissances;

Décrétons :

Article 1^{er}. A partir du 15 Avril, 1888, et jusqu'au 31 Décembre de la même année, il sera perçu et versé à la Caisse de la Commission d'Édilité :

(1.) Un droit supplémentaire de $\frac{1}{2}$ pour mille sur la valeur des importations et des exportations à la Douane d'Alexandrie.

(2.) Un droit additionnel de 1 pour cent sur la valeur locative des immeubles bâtis de la ville d'Alexandrie, telle qu'elle est établie par les rôles actuels.

Art. 2. Les taxes ci-dessus seront perçues par l'Administration des Douanes et par la Daïra Baladiéh respectivement, en ce qui concerne ces Administrations, dans les mêmes formes et sous le bénéfice des mêmes règlements que les autres taxes de l'État.

Art. 3. Notre Ministre des Finances est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret. Fait au Palais de Coubeh, le 14 Avril, 1888 (3 Chaban, 1305).

(Signé) MÉHÉMET TEWFIK.

Par le Khédive :

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres.

(Signé) N. NUBAR.

Le Ministre des Finances,

(Signé) MOHAMED ZEKI.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 166. Secret.)

Cairo, April 21, 1888.

My Lord,

FROM the inclosure in your Lordship's despatch No. 88 of the 6th instant I gather that the Sultan is disposed to resume negotiations with Her Majesty's Government with a view to arriving at a settlement of the Egyptian question.

I venture to submit to your Lordship some observations on this important subject.

I do not at present purpose to dwell on any of the minor points which formed the subject of discussion between Sir Henry Drummond Wolff and the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, such, for instance, as the position of the Financial Adviser, the proposed modifications in the Capitulations, &c.

These points are of importance, but they are all subsidiary to the main issue, which is, whether the British garrison shall evacuate Egypt; and, if so, at what time and under what conditions the evacuation shall take place. I confine my observations to these latter points.

It should never be forgotten that, in the eyes of the Sultan and his advisers, evacuation is merely a preliminary step to the enhancement of Turkish interference in the affairs of Egypt. Of this there cannot, I think, be a shadow of doubt; neither should I be inclined to attach the least importance to any declarations emanating from the Porte in denial of any such ulterior aims.

Equally little can there be any doubt that, from whatever point of view the question be regarded, any increase of Turkish interference in Egypt would be an unmixt evil. I examined this question very fully in my despatch No. 562 to your Lordship of the 14th December, 1887. I may, therefore, curtail my present observations.

The question of improving the Government and Administration of Egypt is not one that solely interests the people of Egypt. If the progress of reform were checked, difficulties would almost infallibly arise to which the Governments of Europe, and especially that of England, would not be able to remain indifferent. I conceive it to be quite certain that the progress of reform would receive a very serious check from the interference of the corrupt and semi-barbarous Government of Turkey, which itself shows every sign of political decrepitude. Further, I believe, that any increase of Turkish interference in Egypt would be extremely unpopular with almost every section of the Egyptian community.

European interests, which are chiefly financial, would, of course, suffer. For the moment, indeed, it serves the purposes of French diplomacy to lean somewhat to Turkish views, but it may confidently be predicted that this apparent identity of interests, which is due to the presence of a British garrison in Egypt, would not survive the withdrawal of that garrison. If the British troops were withdrawn, French diplomacy would almost necessarily gravitate back to the traditional policy of France, which is adverse to any excessive degree of Turkish interference in Egypt.

As to the mass of the people, I am daily more and more convinced that there exists among them a wide-spread and deep-rooted hatred of the aristocracy, who are for the most part Egyptian Turks. I see no reason why the Constantinopolitan Turk should be more popular than the Egyptian Turk, and several reasons why he should be less so. I have from time to time submitted a good deal of evidence to your Lordship on this subject.

For the reasons stated in my despatch No. 562 of the 14th December, neither the Egyptian upper classes nor the Ulema would be well disposed to Turkish predominance in Egypt.

There does, indeed, exist among certain classes of Mahomedans in Egypt, a very considerable feeling of dislike to Christians, especially to Oriental Christians, and this feeling may well be mistaken by any one who is not well acquainted with the country for one of sympathy with the Turks. The two currents of opinion are, however, in reality, very distinct. I am daily more and more convinced that the idea of utilizing Turkish influence for good in Egypt is a pure delusion.

Apart, however, from any arguments based on the undesirability of increasing Turkish influence in Egypt, I venture to maintain that the evacuation of Egypt is, for the time being impossible; it involves risks which it would not be wise to run. In my

despatch No. 562 of the 14th December, 1887, I stated at length my reasons for holding that the elements out of which a stable Government could be formed in Egypt do not for the present exist. To the views stated in that despatch I adhere.

Any arrangement now made with the Porte would, I conceive, be based on the lines of the Convention negotiated by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. That Convention was very skilfully worded. Its chief merit lay in the fact that practically it did not bind Her Majesty's Government to evacuate Egypt at all. Although under Article V the evacuation was to take place in three years, it could be adjourned if at the expiration of that period there were any "appearance of danger in the interior or from without." Further, by an exchange of notes it was provided that the non-acceptation of the Convention by any of the Great Powers of the Mediterranean was to be regarded as an external danger.

It is improbable that we should be able to obtain better terms from the Sultan than those so skilfully negotiated by Sir H. D. Wolff, but I venture to express an opinion that it is undesirable, if it can possibly be avoided, to take even the limited obligations which would have devolved on Her Majesty's Government from the Constantinople Convention.

In the first place, if once an engagement be taken to leave Egypt within a stated period, it appears to me that it will be more difficult than at present to resist the pressure in favour of evacuation, which may be expected not only from the Porte, the French, and possibly the Russian Governments, but also from an influential section of English public opinion who, being but imperfectly acquainted with the real facts of the case, would most erroneously suppose that if once the British garrison were withdrawn the Egyptian question would be practically settled, and would, therefore, support evacuation at almost any price. I say that this supposition is erroneous, for my firm conviction is that if the British garrison were withdrawn within the next few years, the Egyptian question, so far from being settled, would enter into a new and possibly far more troublesome phase than any which is to be anticipated by a continuance of the British occupation.

On the question of the internal danger which might be held to debar the execution of the withdrawal policy, I have the following observations to offer. My own belief is that, if the British garrison were withdrawn, the chances are greatly in favour of the Khedive's Government being upset, with the result that further Egyptian complications, the precise nature of which no one can foresee, would ensue. In support of my belief I can adduce a number of general arguments which are stated at some length in my despatch to your Lordship, No. 562, of the 14th December, 1887. Broadly speaking they amount to this: that the machine of Government in Egypt is complicated to a degree which can perhaps be only appreciated to its full extent by those who, of recent years, have had to take a part in directing it; that the persons on whom we should mainly have to rely for carrying on the work of Government after the withdrawal of the British garrison, are for the most part men of weak character and very mediocre ability, and that the elements for disturbance—agrarian, religious, and national—are ready to hand. It is perhaps even more dangerous to prophecy in the East than elsewhere. It is quite possible that if the experiment were tried my anticipations would be falsified by the event. I can, however, only repeat that, looking at all the facts as they now stand, my belief is that the chances are greatly in favour of a complete upset of Egyptian Government and society within a year or two after the withdrawal of the British garrison.

Further, I believe my opinions on this subject are shared by all those—few in number—who are entitled to speak with any real authority on the present position of affairs in Egypt. Still they are only opinions. They may be met by counter-opinions and counter-conjectures as to the future. It might well happen that, when the moment for evacuation arrived it would be difficult to bring forward any specific facts which would be of a nature to prove the existence of an internal danger. Moreover, the considerations based on the personal qualities of the Khedive and his advisers—although they appear to me to be of great importance—are manifestly arguments of which it is difficult to make much public use.

For these reasons I venture to think that it would be advisable, if possible, to avoid the necessity of proving the existence of an internal danger in order to justify the continuance of the British occupation.

To pass to another point. Article V of the Convention gave Her Majesty's Government the right to reoccupy Egypt "if there were reason to fear invasion from without, or if order and security in the interior were disturbed, &c."

This provision is of great value, and it is most necessary that it should be maintained,

in the event of any future arrangement being negotiated. I ought, however, to observe that I do not think that the fear of reoccupation would of itself prevent the occurrence of any of the incidents which, under Article V, would justify the recall of the British garrison. Indeed, I am not sure that this provision would not operate somewhat in a contrary sense. My own belief is, that very shortly after the British garrison was withdrawn, a very general wish would prevail amongst most classes, that it should return, and the interests involved are so considerable that it is quite possible that internal disturbances might be fomented with the express object of bringing about a reoccupation.

If the British garrison once leaves the country, it appears to me undesirable that it should return. The mere fact of reoccupation would be tantamount to admitting in the face of the world that we had made a great mistake in withdrawing the garrison. Our work in Egypt would have to be begun again. Serious friction might ensue with the Government of France.

Moreover, we should be exposed to all the disadvantages of a joint occupation, for under Article V, the Sultan, equally with Her Majesty's Government, would have a right to send troops to Egypt. At the beginning of the present century, English and Turkish troops occupied Egypt together for a short time, and, although the forces were separated as much as possible, the English army being quartered at Ghizeh, outside Cairo, constant brawls took place. I should, from every point of view, look with considerable anxiety to the prospects of a joint Anglo-Turkish occupation.

I remember that when this subject was under discussion, Nubar Pasha argued that, although an occupation by Turkish troops only was open to great objections, a joint Anglo-Turkish occupation was less objectionable, as the Porte would be so anxious to get the English troops out of the country, that they would do all they could to remove the causes which had contributed to render their presence necessary. I cannot say that I attach much importance to this argument. It is too subtle to exercise much practical influence over the minds of the leading Turkish authorities.

I have one further observation to offer on the specific provisions of the Convention. Article V provided that in the event of reoccupation "the Ottoman troops as well as the British troops will be withdrawn from Egypt, as soon as the causes requiring this intervention shall have ceased." I cannot help thinking that in practice it would be impossible to give effect to this provision. If we are obliged to reoccupy the country, having once withdrawn our troops, there will be only one possible solution of the Egyptian question, and that is that British troops should remain in permanent occupation of Egypt.

In offering these observations I am very far from wishing to criticize the Convention in any hostile spirit. On the contrary, I believe that, if any arrangement is to be made with the Sultan at all, the terms negotiated by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff are, on the whole, the best of which the circumstances of the case admit. More than this, I do not think that it is any matter for regret that the negotiations were undertaken, although they did not lead to any practical result. Although the continued presence of Mouktar Pasha in Egypt is greatly to be regretted, we occupy a much better diplomatic position now than if no attempt had ever been made to come to terms with the Sultan.

The point on which I desire to dwell at present is that we now occupy a different and, in some respects, a more favourable position towards the Sultan than that occupied at any previous period since 1882. The Sultan has had two occasions for acting in a manner conformable to his own interests in Egypt. He might have sent Turkish troops to Egypt in 1882, when he was invited to do so. He might have ratified the Convention negotiated by Sir H. Drummond Wolff. He omitted to avail himself of both opportunities. Are we called upon to offer a golden bridge to His Imperial Majesty that he may retreat from the situation in which he is placed as a consequence of his own diplomatic errors? I cannot think so. It is, indeed, most unfortunate that a combination of circumstances prevents any definite solution of the Egyptian question being arrived at for the time being. No one can feel more frequently and more acutely the inconvenience of the present anomalous and uncertain position than those who, like myself, are engaged in carrying on the work of Government of Egypt. But it appears to me to be better to bear with those inconveniences rather than to apply a remedy which may not improbably be worse than the disease. I venture to think that the best plan to adopt for the present is to take no engagements which may cause further embarrassments, and to keep our hands as free as possible to deal with the Egyptian question in such a manner as the future development of English internal and external policy may render necessary.

On these grounds, I trust it may be found possible to avoid entering into any further negotiations with the Sultan on the main issues of the Egyptian question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 37.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1888.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd instant upon the subject of the advances made from Imperial funds on behalf of Lupton Bey, now a prisoner in the Soudan.

With reference to their Lordships' suggestion that the Egyptian Government should be asked to hand over to Her Majesty's Government the 600*l.* representing arrears of salary which are admittedly due to Lupton Bey, in order that it may be held against the advance which Her Majesty's Government have made, I am to observe that the probable result of such action would be that the Egyptian Government would consider that they had no longer any money to the credit of Lupton Bey's account, and that they might, in consequence, decline to make any further advances with a view to effect his release.

It might not improbably give rise to much unfavourable comment in this country were it to transpire that Her Majesty's Government had insisted upon Lupton Bey's arrears of salary being handed over to them at a time when he was still a captive and entirely dependent for his chance of escape upon pecuniary assistance from Egypt.

I am to state that, in view of the above considerations, Lord Salisbury thinks that the claim must, at all events, be held over for the present.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

No. 38.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

Sir,

Admiralty, April 30, 1888.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward, for the information of the Marquis of Salisbury, a copy of a letter from the Senior Officer in the Red Sea, dated the 4th instant, at Suakin, reporting the proceedings of Her Majesty's ships, and in regard to the state of affairs at that place and at Massowah.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 38.

Commander Neville to Admiral His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

Sir,

"Dolphin," at Suakin, April 4, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Royal Highness that since my last general letter, dated the 21st March, 1888, the following have been the movements of Her Majesty's ships:—

1. The "Albacore" left on Friday, the 23rd March, for a cruise to the southward, returning here the 2nd April (sailing orders and report of proceedings inclosed).
2. The rebels appeared in some force on the 21st March, distant about 6,000 yards. The "Albacore" and "Racer" each fired one round at them, but failed to reach them with Shrapnel; we then fired three rounds of common shell, which burst well amongst them, and had the effect of dispersing them very rapidly. A new fort is being constructed about 400 yards to the north of H Redoubt: the enemy came down to it at 2 A.M. on the 29th March, but retired at once on being fired at by the Gardner gun from H Redoubt and the Nordenfolt from the "Racer." All has been quiet since. Six dervishes gave themselves to this ship yesterday, but would give no information

that was not already known; they were handed over to the military authorities. From information received by the Governor-General, it is believed that Osman Digna does not intend to attack for some time.

I hear from Mr. Cameron, the British Consul here, that considerable trade has lately been carried on with Berber from Agig, several caravans having successfully accomplished the double journey. This trade comes principally from India. The last report, however, is that Osman Digna has stopped it all again. I propose visiting that part of the coast after the departure of General Dormer.

3. Lieutenant and Commander Francis G. Jones reports that all is quiet at Massowah, and that the Abyssinians are in treaty for peace: he considers the Italian positions quite impregnable; they have sent away a large number of troops, and are about to reduce their force to 3,000 men.

Lieutenant and Commander Jones speaks most highly of the courteous and hospitable way in which he and his officers were received by the Italian officers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEVILLE.

No. 39.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 3, 10 A.M.)

(No. 47. Most Secret and Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 3, 1888, 10.12 A.M.

TURKISH AMBASSADOR told me last night negotiations would soon be resumed with Her Majesty's Government about Egypt on lines of Convention. Batoum, and not Egypt, he said, was now the key to India. Why not make an alliance on the basis of England evacuating Egypt, and Turkey signing a Secret Treaty giving England the right, under certain circumstances, of entering the Black Sea? I asked him whether this was merely his own idea. He replied that he had reason to believe it could be carried out, and compared it to the Secret Treaty between Austria and Germany.

I made no reply, except that I had no information on the subject. He added that the Sultan had been compelled to refuse ratification of right of re-entry by overwhelming Mussulman public opinion.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

No. 40.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 112.)

Foreign Office, May 5, 1888.

Sir,
WITH reference to your despatch No. 146 of the 4th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter from the War Office,* from which it will be seen that the Secretary of State for that Department is ready to agree that those British officers who have completed five years' service with the Egyptian army may be permitted to serve with that force for a further term of five years.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 41.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 169.)

Cairo, April 23, 1888.

My Lord,
WITH reference to the last paragraph of my despatch No. 158 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith translations of the letters which were received at Korosko from the European prisoners still detained at Omdurman. I also beg to inclose a letter in original from Lupton Bey. On receipt of these letters yesterday, I consulted with Mgr. Sogaro, the Catholic Bishop of

* No. 34.

Central Africa, and M. de Rosty, the Austrian Consul-General, as to the best course to be pursued in the matter. It was agreed that our best plan would be to interview personally the messenger Saleh-el-Hajali, who is mentioned in the letters as trustworthy, and who is now staying at Assouan. With this object in view Saleh-el-Hajali will shortly be sent down to Cairo, and upon his arrival here will be cross-examined by Mgr. Sogaro as to the best means for effecting the release of the prisoners. I have deemed it better that Mgr. Sogaro should write to Saleh rather than myself, as it will give rise to less publicity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 41.

Letter No. 1 (Italian).

(Translation.)

To his Excellency Abd-el-Kader Pasha, &c., Cairo:

Excellency,

Omdurman, November 10, 1887.

YOUR Excellency will forgive my venturing to address myself to you. On the one hand, necessity compels me to throw myself on your kindness, confidently hoping that I shall find help; on the other hand, I appeal to the friendship which existed between your Excellency and my late father. I remind you of that friendship in order that you may remember a little also the daughter whose father was so great a friend of yours. I have every confidence that you will assist me, and therefore I thank you in anticipation to the best of my power, and I beg you to send that help which you think fit to accord me to Mr. Giorgio Salib, who has relations with the bearer of this letter, who is a most honest and loyal man.

I repeat my prayer, and also my thanks, hoping that your Excellency will help me.

I am your Excellency's most devoted daughter,

(Signed)

GIORGIO VITTORIA,

Daughter of Giorgi Bey.

Inclosure 2 in No. 41.

[Original letter sent to Mr. Lupton, May 9, 1888.]

Dear Sir,

Omdurman, November 27, 1887.

RECEIVED your old letter and now the paint from Saleh. It is not possible for me to leave here at present; no road. Send me money, and I will then when first opportunity offers leave here at once. Saleh, trust him, and I hope all will come well. Send half-a-dozen flannel shirts.

Let family know that I am well and in hope of soon joining them, but they must do all they can to send me money, as without that nothing can be done.

(Signed)

F. T. M. LUPTON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 41.

Letter No. 3 (Italian).

(Translation.)

To Monseigneur Sogaro:

Most Reverend Sir,

Omdurman, November 10, 1887.

AFTER eight months of cruel expectation the man has come at last. With what? With empty hands. What a disappointment. He gave us the letter and the picture. After so many recommendations from us still you have not put trust in our Saleh. We have strong proofs of his honesty. Before he can go and come another year will pass, and meanwhile what are we to do? Happily Saleh has shown himself generous to us. At the time of his departure, without knowing us or you, he left us 15 dollars, and now he has given us 100l., which you will repay there.

You must know that Saleh is our friend, who goes and comes, and who has done us great kindness, therefore we beg you to be generous with him and to help him as far

as lies in your power. Take him under your protection, and see that no harm comes to him. You should know also that Saleh runs no little risk, there are many dangers. In any case have no fear as to his fidelity. What Saleh left us relieved us much, we who are in our own houses. But for those (women) who are in the houses of others—you understand me—it is not enough. Therefore we beg you again to send us a good sum (200l. or a little more), hand them to Saleh, the man is sure. Further, we beg you to pay him, without making difficulties, the 100l. left us here. I think I have explained myself sufficiently. This time do not let him come with empty hands.

If you consign to him a little quinine, laudanum, cream of tartar, tartar emetic, he will bring them willingly. We all ("tutti e tutte") respectfully greet you from our exile.

(Signed) GIUSEPPE OURWALDER.

N.B.—I would ask you to send the inclosed letter to its address at once. It is on account of a poor needy woman who asks for help. Do this act of charity, I beg of you.

(Signed) GIUSEPPE OURWALDER.

You should be in relations with M. Giorgio Salib, who may be of use to you at some time. His brother, Balos Salib, is very pleasant to us here.

Saleh tells me also that he has a letter and a certain paint for a sister at Berber, and that he is promised 200l. if he takes it. We are all here, there is no one at Berber, and at present it is almost impossible to get away. He has brought the letter and the paint to us. This for rectification.

N.B.—Among some medicines I have forgotten to mention soda, which is very valuable. Saleh reminds me of several things which he forgot. Again I beg you to treat him well; he is a faithful man, and if it were possible he would do still more. I salute you again, and am in yours, &c.

(Signed) DON GIUSEPPE OURWALDER.

Omdurman, November 27, 1887.

N.B.—Among the drugs asked for another should be added—iodine. A note has lately reached us from Callisto. Send him our thanks for his good-will. We beg him not to forget us. At present the roads are in some confusion; we hope that the Lord will open some way for us. Brave men can do much. Saleh brought us that ointment; some day perhaps it will be of use to us.

Sciol greets Signor Callisto; tell in secret to Athanasiades and Callisto that she is not yet married, but in secret. I salute you all, and remain yours, &c.

(Signed) DON GIUSEPPE OURWALDER.

I recommend our Saleh highly.

Inclosure 4 in No. 41.

Letter No. 4 (Italian).

(Translation.)

Dear Isidore,

November 27, 1887.

DO me the great kindness to help me quickly, else it may be all up with me.

(Signed) GIORGI CONCETTO.

Inclosure 5 in No. 41.

Letter No. 5 (Italian).

(Translation.)

Address: Signor Giorgio Manasiade, Cairo.

My dear brother-in-law,

AFTER long waiting, after three years and more that I have sighed for help from my relations, at last I have to-day received the 20l. which you have charged this man to hand to me, and with you to pay him the expenses punctually. This man is perhaps the sole person who can help us, and he therefore deserves all your esteem and confidence. As he is faithful, brave, and honourable, I beg you to consign to the same 80l. more, of which I stand in need. I trust that you will not raise any difficulty

about this request of mine. I believed that in you I had a father in place of him whom God has taken from me, but your dilatoriness in helping me has caused me to doubt it much. Dear brother-in-law, I have great need of your help, so that if you do not wish to consider me as your relative and your blood, consider me as one of the poor who come to your door and give me alms. If you wish for news of me, put yourself in relation with Giorgio Salib, and be very careful to keep all a profound secret.

Also my little daughter, who was then fifteen months old, is dead. She was my one consolation, and now there remains for me none other than tears to weep over my terrible misfortunes, whereof the most bitter is the prison in which I am. Greet for me my sister and your daughters. For mercy's sake do not forget me, and believe me your most affectionate sister,

(Signed) VICTORIA GORGIO DEMETTRI.

Inclosure 6 in No. 41.

Letter No. 6 (German).

(Translation.)

[From Slatin Bey to Austrian Consul-General, dated December 1887, acknowledging receipt of 70l. from Saleh Walad Hagg Ali-el-Ababdi.]

No. 42.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

Sir,

War Office, May 8, 1888.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for War to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquis of Salisbury, the inclosed copy of a letter which has been received from the General Officer commanding in Egypt relative to affairs in that country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RALPH THOMPSON.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Major-General Dormer to War Office.

Sir,

Cairo, April 22, 1888.

HAVING returned from my recent inspection and visit to Suakin, I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War, the following Report on the state of affairs in that district and the information which I have been able to obtain.

I arrived at Suakin on the 6th instant, about a fortnight after his Excellency the Governor, Colonel H. H. Kitchener, had returned to resume the duties of his command.

With regard to the military works and defences of the town, I was much struck with the great improvement that has been effected by Colonel Kitchener since my last visit to Suakin in the autumn of 1884. The outer line of works, which now consists of five small forts, or redoubts, are well known, and plans thereof have already been sent home. They are well placed and practically impregnable against any assault which is likely to be made on them.

II Redoubt, on the right, is in course of reconstruction on a better site, about 300 yards to the north of the present redoubt, which is a work on too extensive a scale, and requires too many men to garrison it.

The inner line of defences has been considerably strengthened and much contracted, to suit the reduced garrison now left for the defence of Suakin. It consists of a substantial stone wall and forts very cleverly planned and constructed by Colonel Kitchener, though not quite completed.

I consider that Suakin thus protected, and with at least two gun-boats in the harbour, and with a garrison of one battalion of black troops and one Egyptian, should be quite safe against any attack that Osman Digna is likely to make. At the same

time, I am convinced that any further reduction of ships or garrison would be most perilous, and would probably result in the capture of the place.

2. The danger from within must always be an important factor, and must always cause a certain amount of anxiety, which will be increased or diminished according to the policy that may be adopted in dealing with the tribes, and the influence which Mahdism and Osman Digna may be able to exert and maintain.

With regard to the latter, I believe I had every opportunity of obtaining reliable information, and I may safely state that, at present at least, eight-tenths of the two adjacent important tribes—the Amarars and Hadendowas—are thoroughly sick of the state of affairs and of the country, whereby trade and commerce have been destroyed, the cultivation of land hindered, and their lives and homes disorganized. They are most anxious for a Government.

Their faith in the Mahdi can with difficulty be kept alive, and should Osman Digna be killed or captured, I believe the Khalifa would find but few adherents in this part of the Soudan. I had opportunity given me by Colonel Kitchener of speaking with several influential Sheikhs of both the Amarars and Hadendowas.

They all told the same story: that up till lately there had been much wavering, that many had believed in the Mahdi; that as there was no other Government but his in the country they could not, even if they would, resist the Mahdi's power.

For these reasons, they have never joined heartily in any of the expeditions which have been made against Osman Digna during the last four years. Now, they say, the tribes are tired of this continued disturbance of their lives, tired of Osman Digna and his cruelties, tired of, and losing faith in, the Mahdi.

They all asserted that if only the Egyptian Government would make one more attack against Osman Digna, who is at Handoub, 8 miles from Suakin, with only 2,000 fighting men, their whole tribes would gladly join this time in driving the enemy from their country, and in capturing or dispersing for ever Osman Digna and his forces.

These Sheikhs were told that they must not expect this; that the Government had already sent expedition after expedition, and defeated Osman Digna, routing his forces over and over again; but that their tribes had only acted half-heartedly with us, and had failed to prevent the return of the enemy into their country.

They were asked why, if they were now so united, they could not attack Osman Digna themselves; and they were told that the Government could no longer interfere, and that they must settle their own affairs and the enemy themselves.

To this, while acknowledging the truth of what was said, they replied that they had no arms, and were not strong enough alone to attack the only Government which now existed in the Soudan—that of the Mahdi—and an enemy organized and armed, as they were not.

The day may not be immediately at hand, but I believe it is not far distant, when Mahdism and Osman Digna's power in this part of the Soudan will have ceased to exist.

3. Meantime, I am convinced that the friendly tribes should be subsidized, and that those who have left their homes and property to come in and live at Suakin should be fed. They very justly say: We have thrown in our lot with your Government; we have left our property and lands; how are we to live? You will not let us organize raids nor procure food for ourselves, while you allow the enemy to make raids on us. You say you cannot feed us yourselves. There is nothing left for us but to return to our homes, and, in that case, we shall be forced, in semblance at any rate, to ally ourselves with the Mahdists.

4. With regard to these raids. It is not the fact that raiding by the friendlies has been led, organized, or encouraged by the Government at Suakin; on the contrary, the Sheikhs have been told that these raids are not approved nor recommended; but when these poor friendlies come and say, "The enemy has been suffered to make raids on our lands and villages; may we not make reprisals? We have been deprived of our cattle and our food; may we not go out and obtain these for ourselves?"—it is difficult to prevent or answer them.

5. After several months of comparative peace, and the commencement of the opening out of trade, this peace was disturbed, not by any raid organized at Suakin by the Government, as has been stated, but by an unprovoked attack by the dervishes from Tokar, who carried off camels and cattle of our friendly tribes near Suakin, killing one man, and taking three others prisoners, whom they hanged at Tokar.

This caused a blood feud, and the friendlies of their own accord clamoured for reprisals, and made an unsuccessful raid on Tokar.

Soon after this, Osman Digna, hearing that Suakin was to be abandoned, and that the Black battalion had been withdrawn, marched to Handoub, where he has been ever since, investing and threatening to attack that town. From this time all trade was stopped, and the road to Berber closed and strictly watched by order of the Khalifa.

6. The Governor at Suakin is fully alive to the importance of establishing legitimate trade, and he does nothing to encourage raiding by the friendlies; but he has great difficulty in always preventing the latter when it takes the form of reprisals, or is necessitated by the want of food.

7. It is not for me perhaps to suggest a policy, but I would respectfully beg to recommend the continuance of the occupation of Suakin at any cost, and with no further diminution whatever of the present naval and military defensive force.

I do not advocate any offensive action by the present garrison, although I believe that at this moment Osman Digna and his small army could be easily and completely routed with an additional battalion (of blacks), and with the assistance of the friendly tribes.

I strongly advise that the friendly Sheikhs, inside and outside Suakin, be subsidized and fed.

Beyond this, things should be allowed to take their course, while a keen eye should be kept on any possible opening for trade, and all unnecessary raiding be discouraged.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. C. DORMER.

No. 43.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 11.)

Sir,
Admiralty, May 9, 1888.
I AM commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the perusal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extracts from a letter from the Commanding Officer of Her Majesty's ship "Dolphin," dated the 18th April, reporting proceedings in the Red Sea.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 43.

Commander Neville to the Duke of Edinburgh.

Sir,
"Dolphin," at Suakin, April 18, 1888.
I HAVE the honour to report to your Royal Highness that since my last letter of proceedings, dated the 9th April, 1888, the following have been the movements of Her Majesty's ships:—
I left Suakin on the 10th instant, anchoring at Khor Shinab the next day; left Khor Shinab on the 12th, arriving at Mersa Halaib the 13th, where I remained until the 16th, trying to get information about some slaves I had heard were to have been run from there.

Undoubtedly some slaves are in the neighbourhood, but the appearance of a man-of-war anywhere near quite prevents any attempt to run them.

The "Racer" will leave on the 19th instant for Malta, and will look in near Mersa Halaib, where the slaves are.

This ship and the "Albacore" will remain here for the present.

Everything has been quiet here during my absence.

There have been rumours of an intended attack on the town by Osman Digna, whose reinforcements from Kassala are supposed to have arrived.

Very few of the rebels have been seen lately, and everything is quiet at present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEVILLE.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 180. Secret.)

My Lord.

Cairo, May 3, 1888.

IN my despatch No. 138, Secret, of the 24th March, I had the honour to forward to your Lordship a Report from Mr. Foster, one of the officers of the Irrigation Department, on the condition of the provinces of this country. In continuation of that despatch, I have now the honour to transmit a letter I have received from Mr. Willcocks, also an officer in the Irrigation Department.

Your Lordship will observe that, with reference to the police, Mr. Willcocks states that corruption exists amongst the native policemen. To a certain degree this is no doubt the case. Nothing is more difficult in Oriental countries than to eradicate the custom of taking backsheesh by the police.

I have no doubt that Mr. Willcocks is quite right in thinking that improvement under this head depends on the degree of European supervision which is exercised over the police.

It will further be observed that Mr. Willcocks condemns the "Rachat Militaire," that is, the system of allowing exemption from military service to be purchased for a fixed sum. On this point Sir Edgar Vincent has furnished me with a Memorandum, inclosed herewith, answering Mr. Willcocks' observations.

With reference to sales of land by Decrees of the Courts, Mr. Willcocks says that sufficient publicity is not given to such sales. I have been in communication with Mr. Cookson and Mr. Hills, the English Judge of the Mixed Court of Appeal, on this subject, and I am informed that advertisements of the sales in question are inserted in certain of the Arabic newspapers. The matter is one in which the Court of Appeal takes a strong interest, and I will inquire whether it would not be possible to give a wider publicity to these sales.

The last point upon which Mr. Willcocks touches in his letter is the manner in which the sales of Government land are conducted. The fellaheen, he says, complain bitterly that they never have a chance of buying an acre. On this point I have the honour to inclose a Memorandum by Sir E. Vincent, which shows that the Government have done all that is possible to assist the native population in acquiring land.

Taking Mr. Willcocks' Report as a whole, it is, I think, very satisfactory evidence of the beneficial results of the English occupation. The complaints which Mr. Willcocks has heard in the provinces are themselves sufficient to show this. A few years ago complaints of what may be termed the details of administration were unknown. They were overshadowed by complaints of the whole system of government. At present the government of the country is carried on in accordance with the principles of European civilization, with the result that, for the first time in their existence, the people of Egypt are able to raise their voices against matters of minor importance, by which they may think that their interests are injured.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 44.

Mr. Willcocks to Sir E. Baring.

Tanta, April 25, 1888.

Dear Sir Evelyn Baring,

IN accordance with your instructions, I send you the opinions expressed by the Sheikhs and fellaheen with whom I have come in contact:—

Army.—Egyptian officers get on much better with English officers than with Turkish, because there is more fair dealing and more chance of getting well-paid appointments. The Egyptians also consider the Turkish officers as men of no social position, but Mameluks and hangers-on of big Pashas; they consider the English officers, on the contrary, as all of good family, which with them carries considerable weight. They did not see what difference there was between themselves and the Turks, but they do see the difference between themselves and the English. While there are so many English officers in the Egyptian army, the great majority think there would be no possibility of a rising of the fellaheen against the Government in case of the withdrawal of the English army. (They used to talk differently some time ago.) They say the rising must begin with the officers; the soldiers themselves would never rise. Any way, there would be plenty of

notice, as there are no Secret Societies of any kind, and no bond between officers and men. No one objects to the English soldiers in Egypt except Cairenes and Alexandrians with Turkish proclivities.

Police.—The police are decidedly unpopular. They like the English police officer, as they are no takers of "backshish," and are not arrogant and bullying like the Turks. They have the power, and do not care for the daily display of power and authority which the Turks loved. The policemen, however, they detest, and they complain that they do not see near enough of English officers, and are not sufficiently supervised. The police live on open bribery, as they are chosen to report on "gafirs" and others, when they themselves are not one whit more reliable. A dollar all round is considered sufficient to square the police. Without exception, everybody complains that the English supervision of the police is insufficient. They believe much in "like master, like man," but add that the master must be always with his men. Everybody I talk to thinks there is an English Protectorate of the country.

"*Rachat Militaire*," considered by all as the high road to poverty for the fellaheen, who would sooner sell an acre of land, if they owned only three acres, and escape the conscription. The Greek money-lenders have again begun to lift up their heads now that the "rachat" is in full swing.

Village Sheikhs.—The fellaheen themselves say that a village which has a good Sheikh is not allowed to get into debt like a village which has a bad Sheikh. They wonder that not more pains are taken to make only good men village Sheikhs who have much power for good or ill.

Native Tribunals.—Every Judge is considered "bribeable." No one dreams of justice. Chance, expediency, and a big purse are considered as the best weapons wherewith to win a case.

Mixed Tribunals.—Everybody complains that the proceedings are entirely in a foreign language. A Greek or Jew can always win his case against a fellah, as the latter does not understand one word of what is going on, and is entirely in the hands of his lawyer, whom he considers as bribed by the Greek to lose the case. It is certainly a pity that the proceedings in the Mixed Tribunals should not be translated into Arabic as the case goes on. There is not a fellah or a small Sheikh who does not think that his case is hopeless once it gets into the Mixed Tribunals.

Land Sales by Decrees of the Court.—The men in the village and the Egyptians generally are not kept informed of these sales; and lands are sold for half what they are worth to banks and Greeks, who work among themselves. They tell me, with what truth I do not know, that these Decrees, land sales, &c., are advertised in Alexandria and in the European papers, but not in the Arabic papers. This might be remedied if true.

Public Land Sales.—A scandal. The fellaheen have never a chance given them of buying these lands. You remember in Roman history how severe were the wars between the Italian peasantry and the patricians, because the Senate never gave the peasantry a chance of buying the State lands. Caesar owed more of his popularity to his recognizing this blot, and insisting on the peasantry being allowed to buy the land in small parcels, than to any other of his popular measures. We might gain great popularity by letting the fellaheen of a village buy these State lands in small plots. The fellaheen complain bitterly of never having a chance of buying an acre, while Government officials, &c., can always buy what they please for a song, whatever may be the real value of the land.

I send you exactly what I have heard, and hope you do not think me impertinent for writing about Departments other than my own. Of course, no man would be fool enough to tell me my own mistakes and errors or shortcomings.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) W. WILLCOCKS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 44.

Memorandum by Sir E. Vincent on the "Rachat Militaire."

THE recent reduction in the price of exemption from military service from 40*l.* to 20*l.* has caused great satisfaction among the agricultural classes, and has permitted a large number to obtain their freedom.

Fear has been expressed in some quarters that the fellaheen, in their desire to purchase an exemption from the army, will again resort to the village usurer. The same

cry of alarm was raised in 1885, when 250,000*l.* were paid to the Government under this head. In that year I instituted an inquiry into the matter, the result proving that no cause for alarm existed.

The majority of those who pay the exemption are the sons of Sheikhs and Omdehs, or of other villagers who have money buried in the earth. It was proved that only an insignificant proportion borrowed money for the purpose of obtaining an exemption, while a few small proprietors sold 1 or 2 feddans from an estate of 10 or 20 feddans, in order to raise the money. In these cases the land passed to other villagers, as the Greeks do not willingly either lend or advance money on land. In many cases, it appeared that the whole family subscribed to provide an insurance fund against military service.

(Signed) EDGAR VINCENT.

May 1, 1888.

Inclosure 3 in No. 44.

Memorandum by Sir E. Vincent on the Government Sales of Land.

GREAT difficulty has been experienced in all Eastern countries in giving the agricultural classes sufficient notice of sales of land in their district. In Egypt the following means are adopted with a view of giving sufficient publicity of a coming sale of Government land.

The Mudir or Governor publishes the notice of any sale at least twenty days before the date of auction, giving all particulars as to the area of the various parcels, limits of prices, taxes, &c.

This notice is posted up in the village: the Sheikh-el-Belad also announces the sale to the fellaheen by public criers. The offers have to be made before a fixed hour on the day of sale.

The result of these arrangements in connection with the sales of Government lands has been to obtain very satisfactory prices from the fellaheen purchasers. There is no ground for the assertion, that the Government land is being sold in large quantities to land speculators, either native or foreign, almost all recent sales having been made direct to the fellaheen.

In the case of sales of lands by the Tribunals, a more extended publicity than is now obtained would be advantageous both to the vendor and vendee.

(Signed) EDGAR VINCENT.

May 1, 1888.

No. 45.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received by telegraph, May 12.)

(No. 189. Ext. 88.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 12, 1888.

I RECEIVED by last mail a letter from Mr. Lupton, saying that he had seen in the "Times" that I was in communication with his brother, Lupton Bey, and begging me, therefore, to forward on a letter written by Mme. Lupton, the mother, to her son at Omdurman.

I accordingly telegraphed to Colonel Kitchener to inquire whether he thought there was the least possibility of his being able to forward the letter to its destination. In reply, Colonel Kitchener stated that it would be very difficult to do so, but that he could try and send the letter from Agig; the result, however, would be most doubtful.

Upon the receipt of this answer this morning, I had the honour to telegraph to your Lordship, requesting that Mr. Lupton should be informed that I would send Mme. Lupton's letter to Suakin, but that I did not think there was much chance of Colonel Kitchener's being able to forward it by that route.

I stated, however, that if Mr. Lupton could get a letter photographed on paper as thin as possible and in the smallest type which can be read by the naked eye, I might perhaps be able to send it by the Nile route. Two or three pieces, about an inch square, would, I said, be easier to send than one bigger piece. I also added that it would be advisable to send a verbal message as well.

Your Lordship's reply sent by mail, after consideration of my despatch No. 183 of

the 5th instant, will reach me before the messenger to whom it is proposed to intrust the letter leaves on his return journey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 46.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 183.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 5, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to report that this morning M. Sogaro, Sir Francis Grenfell, and myself had a long interview with the messenger who recently brought letters from Lupton Bey and others at Khartoum.

I should explain that this is not the man by whom some while ago 200*l.* was sent to Lupton Bey. We have as yet no news as to whether this latter sum was received by Lupton Bey or not.

We all think that the man is fairly trustworthy. He appeared to be telling the truth.

I have arranged that he should receive a reward, and that the money paid by him to Slatin Bey and others should be repaid.

He says that all the prisoners are very carefully watched, especially Slatin Bey. The latter is a sort of aide-de-camp to the Khalifa. He receives rations, but no money. Lupton Bey is employed at the Mint. The messenger showed me an Egyptian sovereign which had been coined at Khartoum. None of the prisoners are ill-treated except M. Neufeld, who is kept in chains. The messenger thinks that, with the help of money, escape may perhaps be possible. He is able to bring letters out, but cannot take any back, as on his return journey he is sure to be searched.

He is now about to return to the neighbourhood of Assouan, where he will remain for the month of Ramadan, which begins in a few days. He will then be ready to start again for Khartoum. He will report himself to Colonel Wodehouse, the Commandant at Assouan, before he leaves. I will see that money is sent to Lupton Bey, and also the flannel shirts for which he asked. I should feel obliged if your Lordship would ascertain and inform me whether Lupton Bey's family wish to send any message to him. As I have already mentioned, the message must be verbal. I cannot arrange for the transmission of any letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 47.

Messrs. Fox and Wyld to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 15.)

My Lord,

8, Queen Anne's Gate, Westminster, May 14, 1888.

WE have the honour to enumerate to your Lordship the Resolutions submitted to you by the deputation that waited on your Lordship at the Foreign Office on Friday, the 11th May, regarding the pacification of the Soudan by trade.

1. That the British Government will countenance and support British trade merchants in their endeavours to restore the trade of the Soudan, by procuring the opening of the tribal ports north and south of Suakin with reasonable customs dues.

2. That a small naval force be retained on the Soudan coast, with the view to suppress the Slave Trade, and to afford protection and support to the merchants who may establish themselves at the ports, and that known and notorious slave dealers and traders shall be punished and removed from the sphere of their operations.

3. That merchants be not interfered with by the Egyptian authorities, as long as they confine themselves to legitimate trade, and do not import contraband of war, and they engage to use their best endeavours to bring about peace between the tribes and the Egyptian authorities.

In reference to your Lordship's reply to the deputation, we should deem it a favour if you would kindly forward us an answer to the Resolutions submitted you, assuring us that Her Majesty's Government are willing to instruct the Egyptian Government to grant English traders every facility for dealing with the tribes of the Eastern Soudan, and that no obstacles shall be placed by the Egyptian authorities in the way of goods,

not contraband of war, leaving Suakin for the tribal ports north and south of that place, paying the usual customs dues, as before the war, based on those levied in Egypt at Alexandria.

With regard to Resolution No. 2, the only support from the naval force required is their patrolling for the suppression of the Slave Trade, and the prevention of attack on the tribal ports by armed dhows from Jeddah, and the punishment of slave-dealers residing at Suakin when cases are brought against them as set down by Treaty.

We have, &c.

(Signed) FRANCIS WM. FOX.
A. B. WYLDE.

No. 48.

Mr. Lupton to Foreign Office.—(Received May 17.)

Sir, 38, Leadenhall Street, May 16, 1888.
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your favour dated the 11th instant, also copy of a despatch from Sir E. Baring dated at Cairo the 5th May.

As sending a letter would probably compromise my brother, his family decide not to send one. Should the letter now on the way to him from his mother be at all likely to do harm, his mother would wish it to be returned.

Referring to the verbal message you were good enough to suggest, Lupton Bey's relatives would be greatly obliged if Sir E. Baring would tell the messenger to say "They are all well and are anxiously awaiting good news from him."

Gratefully thanking you for your favours, I am, &c.

(Signed) MALCOLM P. LUPTON.

No. 49.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 119.)

Sir, Foreign Office, May 18, 1888.
WITH reference to your telegram No. 88 of the 12th instant, I transmit to you herewith, for your information and guidance, a copy of a letter from Mr. Malcolm Lupton,* giving the terms of a verbal message which he wishes conveyed, if possible, to his brother, Lupton Bey.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 50.

Foreign Office to Messrs. Fox and Wylde.

Gentlemen, Foreign Office, May 18, 1888.
I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th instant, recapitulating the Resolutions submitted to his Lordship on the 11th instant by a deputation of gentlemen interested in the pacification of the Soudan by trade.

In reply, I am to state that Lord Salisbury is not acquainted with anything in the conduct of the Egyptian Government on the Red Sea coast which is at variance with the general policy recommended by those gentlemen.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JULIAN PAUNCEFOTE.

* No. 48.

No. 51.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 188.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 12, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 109 of the 11th instant, informing me that the King of the Belgians had offered on behalf of the Congo State to contribute to any fund which may be raised with a view to assist Lupton Bey in effecting his escape.

I have discussed this matter fully with Nubar Pasha and with Sir Francis Grenfell. The result of our deliberations is that we do not for the present see any way of turning the generous offer made by His Majesty to practical account. It will, however, be borne in mind. It is possible that at some future time circumstances may change to such an extent as to render the creation of a fund for the release of Lupton Bey desirable.

Whatever may be the amounts legally due to Lupton Bey, the Egyptian Government is quite prepared to spend whatever reasonable sums are necessary in order to facilitate his escape. The effect of raising a fund would be to increase the amount available, but there is at present no reason to suppose that a few thousand pounds would be more likely to effect the object in view than a few hundreds. Indeed, I am not sure that the smaller sums, as being less likely to attract attention, would not be more likely to succeed than the larger.

We cannot feel sure that Lupton Bey has received the money already sent to him. The last heard of the messenger who took 200l. was that he was at Berber.

The best chance is, I think, to trust the man now in Egypt, about whom I wrote to your Lordship on the 5th instant in my despatch No. 183, more especially as, in a letter which is unquestionably genuine from Lupton Bey, he asks that this man should be trusted. He will be sent with 200l. to Lupton Bey after Ramadan is over.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 52.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 123.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 24, 1888.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a letter from Mr. A. F. Buxton,* suggesting, with reference to the recent reopening of trade in the Eastern Soudan, the adoption of measures for preventing the importation of spirits into the country; and I shall be glad to be favoured with any observations which you may have to offer in regard to this proposal.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 53.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Lord Vivian.

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 25, 1888.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 18, Africa, of the 28th ultimo, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt,† relative to the offer made by the King of the Belgians, on behalf of the Congo State, to contribute to any fund which may be raised for the relief of Lupton Bey.

It will be seen that Sir E. Baring has fully discussed the matter with Nubar Pasha and Sir F. Grenfell, the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, with the result that it appears hardly practicable to take advantage of His Majesty's offer for the present. The matter will, however, be borne in mind in case of any change of circumstances rendering the creation of a fund for the release of Lupton Bey desirable.

I have to request that your will reply to M. von Eetvelde's communication of the 28th April in the sense of Sir E. Baring's despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) SALISBURY.

* Mr. A. F. Buxton, May 17, 1888

† No. 51.

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L

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 192. Secret.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 17, 1888.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 180 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter which I have received from Mr. Garstin, of the Irrigation Department, as to the condition and feeling in the provinces.

Mr. Garstin's observations are well worthy of your Lordship's attention, and the conclusions at which he arrives are in accordance with independent testimony which I have from time to time received on the points in question.

It will be observed that Mr. Garstin states that the power of the village Sheikhs has been greatly diminished of late years owing in a considerable degree to the reform of many of the administrative abuses which existed prior to the English occupation. There can be no doubt, I think, that this is the case. The reforms carried out under English control have undoubtedly vastly increased the happiness and welfare of the labouring classes. But, as I have already had the honour to point out to your Lordship on previous occasions, they cannot be said to have increased the possibility of a speedy evacuation of the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 54.

Mr. Garstin to Sir E. Baring.

May 14, 1888.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward the following replies to the questions about which you asked me to write.

Those questions were:—

1. Whether the people generally liked the English, or preferred them to the French, and whether they preferred Turkish to English rule.
2. Whether there was any sympathy with Arabi still in the country; also what were their feelings regarding the present Khedive and the ex-Khedive.
3. What was the general opinion in the country as to what would happen supposing we were to leave it.
4. As to the state of the people generally, whether more prosperous since the English occupation or not.

1. As to their feeling regarding the English: I believe that the Sheikhs dislike us, and it is only natural that they should do so. Their power and authority over their villagers is not one quarter what it used to be: in olden times the Sheikh was entirely master over the fellaheen in his village, and he made them work as he pleased, and when and where he pleased; no one could leave the village to work anywhere else without his permission; their women and their cattle were practically his, and, in fact, his power was almost absolute. Now all this is changed. Since the abolition of the kourbash, but chiefly through the abolition of the corvée, the power of the village Sheikh is almost gone; paid labour, through contract work, has also done a great deal to break his power, as the people not only will not now work for nothing, but will go long distances from their villages to work with the European contractors, and they do this now without asking the permission of the Sheikh.

I know for a fact that, as a rule, the Sheikh has now to pay the labourers who work in his fields, either in money or in kind, and any one who knows what the country was three years ago will appreciate what a revolution this means.

I have been trying hard for some time past to introduce a system of Sheikh contracts, whereby the Sheikhs would each clear their own small village canals and get paid for their work: by this I hoped to assist them a little, and make up in some degree for the losses they have undoubtedly suffered from our innovations. This system has only partially succeeded; some of the Sheikhs have done the work fairly well, but I find that many of them could not get their people to work for them, and have been obliged to sublet their contracts to petty Greek contractors. Of course, this is partially owing to their being too grasping and not paying the people enough, but still it shows how the power of the Sheikh is broken when he cannot force his people to work, even when he pays them. Three years ago he would have taken the money

and made the people work without paying them at all, and never a complaint would have been heard; now he cannot do anything, or make them work unless he pays them the same as a European would do. Can it be wondered at that the Sheikh dislikes in his heart the English rule? He is quite intelligent enough to see that it is the English who have done this, and he recognizes fast enough the difference between English and French: he would, I should say, prefer the latter, on the principle of anything for a change.

As an Arab said to me, the Sheikh would much prefer being beaten himself, so long as he still had the power of beating others.

An English contractor told me that on starting some new work in a remote part of the district the Sheikh of the village would not come to terms about supplying men, and told him that not a man of his village should come and work. The contractor offered certain rates of pay, and the villagers hearing this turned out *en masse* on the work, leaving the Sheikh without a man to work on his property.

Of course, the Sheikh has benefited equally with every one else by improved water supply and by the cost of irrigation being much less than formerly, but I do not believe that in his heart these benefits weigh at all with his loss of power and money, for, of course, he is less rich now than he used to be, by the amount he has to pay his people for anything they do for him, and by the amount that he used to squeeze out of them in many different ways.

The Pashas as a class, of course, dislike the English, as they, even more than the Sheikhs, have suffered in power of doing harm and of oppressing the people. Formerly a Pasha's canals were cleared by the corvée before any one else's, and any bit of work he wanted done was wrought up at the "Gadwal," and called a "work of public utility," and as such done by the corvée. Now, all private canals are struck off the lists, and if the owners want them cleared they have to pay for the clearances.

I do not think the Pasha's opinions need be considered in this note; it goes without saying that they dislike the English, whatever they may profess.

The fellah, in his dull way, does, I believe, like the English rule; not the English as English, for I do not believe that the great mass of the people can recognize any difference between English, French, Italians, or any other purely European nation. They do, however, see that the present Administration has given them great relief; they have no gratitude, that virtue having been omitted from the Arab character, but they do, though, as I say, in a dull, dim, sort of way, appreciate that they have much easier times now than they used to have. This they know they owe to the present foreign Government; they are told that the English rule the country, and, therefore, do ascribe these benefits to them; but I do not think that the name of Englishman means much more to the average fellah than that of Frenchman would do. Their general feeling as to what is being done for them is, I think, rather bewilderment, and may, I think, be fairly expressed by what some of them told a merchant in Dahbalia with reference to our works, "that we were upsetting the world;" they don't understand what is being done, but they feel they have better times than they used to have, and are pleased, though not grateful.

One point regarding the English I have heard them notice very often, and always with astonishment, and that is, that the Englishman generally never interferes with, or tries to get hold of, their women. They do contrast him in this way with other nations, and particularly with the Greek and the Frenchman. They will talk about this freely, and look upon it as a peculiarity of the English race, and I believe they do appreciate this, even though they cannot understand it.

Another point on which they will speak freely, and on which both Sheikhs and fellaheen are unanimous, is, in hating and detesting Turkish rule. I do not mean that they detest the Turk as a Turk; both being Muslims, I believe they prefer him personally to a European: they have, however, a horror and fear of being again governed by the Turk. It is too recent for them to have forgotten it, and the Sheikhs know well that, under the Turk, none of their property is safe to them; their women, their land, and their money would be all liable to be seized: they will tell many tales of Turkish tyranny and oppression; how as, in one instance, a Sheikh related a Bey came to his village and stayed there until he had had almost every woman in the village brought to him; he being a Government official, they did not dare to refuse him what he wanted: they will also tell many tales of how the kourbash was used to extract money from them.

I am sure they unite and are sincere in dreading Turkish rule, and yet paradoxical as it may seem, were it to be put to the vote of the country generally, whether they would have the Turks back to govern them, or remain under English rule, I should

not be the least surprised were they to vote for the Turk! This would be caused solely by religious feeling, but I am certain of one thing, let them try the Turk again for one year, and at the end of that time they would, if they could, implore the English to return.

There are two classes of people in this country whom all unite in hating, Pasha, Sheikh, and fellah alike; those are the Syrian and the Greek: there is no doubt whatever of their sincerity here. It is not surprising; a very large portion of the best land in the country has passed and is still passing into their hands. In all the larger towns, you will find the richest men and the largest land-owners are the Greeks and the Syrians. Of course, they have acquired this land by lending money at most usurious interest on mortgages on the land, but their practices in acquiring the land would hardly bear inspection in a civilized country. When a Greek lends an Arab money, say 10*l.*, he will take a receipt from him for 20*l.*, saying nothing in this receipt of the rate of interest he charges, so it would be very difficult for any Law Court to check this, and say his rate of interest was too high. The native Tribunals assist these men greatly in their malpractices, as of course they are able to bribe heavily, and do. In their favour is to be said that, when an Arab borrows money, he does so with the firm and fixed intention of never repaying it, and he will use every means in his power to avoid doing so.

However, if they are united upon one point it is in intense hatred of these two classes, and I ought to add the Jew. As an Egyptian land-owner said to me the other day, "There are two worms in this country far worse than the cotton worm: one is the Syrian and the other the Greek, and those two worms are gradually eating up our country." I am convinced this is the general feeling, and Arabi knew this well and worked upon it, as any similar agitator would again.

As rather against what I said about the fellah not recognizing the difference between English and French, &c., an Englishman told me the other day that he was riding through a village, and was assailed with the usual abuse by the boys and small children; he heard one of the Sheikhs say, "Don't do that, he is an Inglese," and made them stop. Another Englishman told me that, on passing a village, and being called names, he rode up and asked them why they did so: the Sheikhs replied, "Excuse the children, they didn't know you were an Englishman; they thought you were only a 'Nasrani' (Christian)!" This is rather comic, their using it as a complimentary distinction that an Englishman was not a Christian!

Both the above instances, which I believe to be perfectly true, show that they do, to a certain extent, separate Englishmen from other nations in their minds: I do not, however, think that the fellahen in general do, though the Sheikhs may.

One more point. I think the Arabs distinguish the English by, *i.e.*, their straightness, I mean that they tell the truth. I do not think they look upon this as a virtue, merely as an eccentricity; but they certainly do believe in an Englishman's word. They have a proverb which they often use, when wishing to say that a man can be trusted: "He says yes and no like an Englishman." I think, too, they do not believe that Englishmen as a rule can be bribed: this again they do not look upon as a virtue, rather as foolishness, but I am sure they recognize it as part of the English character.

As far as I know, not one Englishman in the Irrigation Department has ever been offered a suspicion of a bribe; this is not from any knowledge of our characters personally, as they knew nothing whatever about us. I mention the Irrigation Department as the one I know best, and also because, seeing how important the water supply is to an Arab, and what a difference it may make to him whether the planks in a certain regulator are taken out or put in, and the level of water consequently lowered or raised, and seeing that the regulation is entirely in our hands, I think it must show that they consider bribes thrown away on an Englishman; that they have never offered one to any one, either in the form of money, or in any shape whatever.

I think, too, their confidence is increasing; they come forward with their Petitions personally now much more than they used to do; and even the fellahen do this. I noticed this confidence particularly at the Agricultural Council we hold yearly at Zagazig to discuss what is to be done in the way of irrigation works during the ensuing year. All the Sheikhs come to this, and all are allowed to speak freely and give their opinions.

Three years ago it took the better part of five days to get through this Council, and it was one continual fight and wrangle among the Sheikhs themselves.

Last year it only took three days to do; while this year I finished the whole thing, *i.e.*, settled the work for the three provinces, in one day. There was very little discussion, though all the Sheikhs were present, and each were invited to speak if they

wanted to. I think this shows a growing confidence in our measures, and that they are more content to await the results of these measures than they were before, even though they don't understand them.

I may say here that I am sure that the publication of an English newspaper in Arabic, as has been lately done, is one of the best things that has yet been attempted for giving the natives a fair idea of what the English are trying to do. They get most of their ideas from the vernacular papers, which are read in almost every village; and before the publishing of this paper they only heard one side, and that, as a rule, against the English. Now they will hear both sides, and that must be a good thing.

2. As regards sympathy with Arabi Pasha, I do not believe that among the Sheikhs and fellahen he has any sympathisers whatever (though he may have among the Pasha class), for the simple reason that he failed, and is now down.

An Arab has no sympathy whatever with any one who fails, or is out of favour; and, consequently, I do not think that Arabi has any friends among the fellahen. They talk of him with contempt and as a fool; but, at the same time, were he to return and have any success, he would have as large a following as ever. And the same would be the case with any one of the same sort who showed any power of being stronger than the existing Government at the time, and who knew how to work upon the feelings of the fellah regarding his debts and his hatred of the Greek and Syrian, as Arabi undoubtedly did know how to do.

As regards their feeling towards the present Khedive, I do not think it is very strong either way. They don't, I think, feel any great respect for him, but they do not dislike him. They talk of him always as a "good man," but say little more. For an Arab really to like a ruler, he must at the same time fear him.

Far different is the way in which they talk of the ex-Khedive Ismail. It is easy to see with what a wholesome fear he inspired them; they profess to dislike him, and I believe they are sincere when they say they do; but let him return, and the whole country would greet him with acclamations, simply because the fear of him is still present with them.

3. As to what would happen were we to leave the country, it is difficult, I may say impossible, to get at the Arab feeling on a question like this. I don't think they (I mean the villagers) have formed any opinions whatever about it, or that they even think about it. I am sure they do not conspire or form any plan. They would simply carry out the wishes and ideas of any person strong enough to work them up into doing anything, whether revolt, or massacre, or both. They are easy tools, but not capable of conspiring themselves.

My own firm belief is, and I know it is shared by almost every European in the provinces, that the English army leaving Egypt would lead to an almost exact repetition of the scenes of 1882, that is, another Arabi, and more massacres of the Christians in the provinces.

I do not think this state of things would at once follow the evacuation, as the Arabs are a slow-thinking and slow-moving people. It might possibly take two years or so, but that it would come I am certain; and all we are doing to ameliorate the condition of the fellah would only accelerate it, as the tendency of all our benefits is to make him less submissive and afraid of those in power. I do not think he is by nature very fanatical; he is too easy-going and too lazy; but all his training tends to make him so, and the fanaticism is there, dormant, and ready to spring forth with any encouragement. All his training and bringing up tends to keep this hatred of the Christian alive.

At this present time, in most villages in the provinces, even where one is well-known, one is greeted with abuse by the children, called "son of a dog" and "son of a pig," and very frequently stones are thrown at one. Their favourite and commonest song is a filthy and obscene rhyme about the Christian. It is true it is only the children who do this, but it shows how they are trained and brought up; and though their elders never join in this abuse, yet they will sit by and listen to it without ever attempting to check it. Though, as I have said, I do not think the fellah is by nature very fanatical, yet he is brought up from a child to hate and despise the Christian, and remove the restraining power of a strong Government, which means the English army: it would take very little to fan his fanaticism into a flame that would certainly result in massacres of Europeans in the district.

There are a great number of people in the larger towns who do their best to keep this feeling alive, so as to be ready when the time may come; and I am certain that were the English to leave the country the events of 1882 would repeat themselves, though perhaps not at once.

4. As to the state of the people in general, I have no hesitation in saying, and I am sure every one who knows the provinces well will agree with me, that the state of the fellah generally is far more prosperous than it was three years ago.

He has few burdens now except the maladministration of justice and unfair taxation. He is not now obliged to work in the corvée except in a very light degree, and next year he will not be obliged to work at all; he cannot be beaten with the kourbash, he has water almost everywhere in abundance at all seasons, and he can, if he chooses, get a fair price for his daily labour from almost any contractor. He is richer too, as his crops are better assured, and, owing to the higher level at which water is now delivered, he does not require to work his "sakia" for anything like the time he used to have to do, and, consequently, his cattle last him better.

Very much remains to be done for him, but he is undoubtedly much better off now than he used to be, and he knows this, and knows that it is the present Administration that has done this for him, even though the English may be only a name to him.

At the same time, I do not think his character is at all improved by prosperity; he "cannot stand corn," and is apt when he waxes fat to kick. He is much more insolent in his manner than before, and, I think, would be much more ready to rise against authority than he used to be.

I expect the Sheikhs and Pashas feel this change more than any one, and they must, I think, curse the English in their hearts for being the cause of it.

The more I see of the fellah, the more I am convinced that he is far better off, considering what his wants are, than the agricultural labourer in almost any country in the world. Starvation is quite unknown in Egypt; he never has to consider where he will get a meal for the following day. Owing to the temperate climate his wants as regards clothes are few, and he always has enough, though it may only be a "galabieh." He always has a roof of some sort to cover him. He does not drink. He never does one stroke more work than he chooses to do. He generally has tobacco to smoke. He has no education; and, what he considers the greatest necessity of all, he always has a woman of some sort, whether wife or mistress.

I think there are very many poor in England, Scotland, or Ireland, or in any European country, who would gladly change places with the fellah.

In conclusion, I would say that what you said to me, that the more we did for the country the more difficult it would be for us to leave it, is one of the facts that impress one the more one goes about and knows the people, and the longer one stays in the country.

Even though the people did not rise let our Government be withdrawn, and I think it is no exaggeration to say that in three months' time everything we had done would be upset, and all the abuses would come in again as though they had never been temporarily suspended.

I think myself they would rise, not perhaps against the Government, but against the Christian. There is no such thing as public opinion in this country, and there would never, I think, be any combination beforehand, but there is a very strong force always ready in their religious feelings and fanaticism. Every day we stop in the country will make it harder for the fellah if we eventually leave it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. E. GARSTIN.

No. 55.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received May 31.)

Sir,

Treasury Chambers, May 30, 1888.

THE Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury have had before them Sir Philip Currie's letter of the 30th ultimo, further on the subject of the advances made from Imperial funds on behalf of Lupton Bey, now a prisoner in the Soudan; and I am to request that you will inform the Secretary of State that my Lords, in view of the representations made therein, do not propose under present circumstances to press their suggestion that the Egyptian Government should be asked to hand over to Her Majesty's Government the 600*l.* representing arrears of salary which are admittedly due to Lupton Bey in order that it may be held against the advance which Her Majesty's Government have made.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. L. JACKSON.

No. 56.

Foreign Office to Mr. A. B. Wylde.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 31, 1888.

I AM directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant, and to state to you, in reply, that, according to information received in this Department, there is no reason to suppose that Shenawi Bey carries on a Traffic in Slaves.

I am, &c.

(Signed) P. CURRIE.

No. 57.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 205.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 27, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a statement by a certain Idris-el-Nur at Suakin, which has been communicated to me by General Sir Francis Grenfell.

The Report states, as your Lordship will observe, that the child of M. Hansal, late Austrian Consul at Khartoum, and four members of the Soudan Mission, were brought, amongst others, by Abu Girgeh to Handoub from Kassala. I do not consider that implicit confidence should be attached to this man's statement. I have, however, communicated its contents to Mgr. Sogaro and to M. de Wass, the Acting Austrian Consul-General, through Mr. Consul Cookson at Alexandria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 57.

Statement of Idris-el-Nur, a Dongolawi, formerly servant to Mr. Lombroso, Postmaster at Khartoum. (This man was recognized by Marcopoli Bey.)

ABU GIRGEH has been wishing to move the force to Tokar, and intends, in any case, going there himself. But Osman Digna replied that he had been given authority to do what he thought best; and he considered it better to stay at Handoub, and that if Abu Girgeh goes to Tokar he must go by himself, and no dervish should leave Handoub.

Abu Girgeh brought with him from Kassala the child of M. Hansal, the Austrian Consul at Khartoum, as well as the following: El Hamudi, clerk in the Treasury at Khartoum; Mohamed Osman, clerk in the Mudirich; and two other Government employés; the two servants of Marcopoli Bey, who are now Mukaddam and Emir of Gihadiyeh respectively, and Giulio Yusef, Maria, and Benedetta, from the Mission.

Suakin, May 12, 1888.

No. 58.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 7.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 5, 1888.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a letter received from Commander Neville, of Her Majesty's ship "Dolphin," dated the 2nd May, 1888, reporting the movements of Her Majesty's ships in the Red Sea, and the recent proceedings taken against the rebels in the neighbourhood of Suakin.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Commander Neville to Admiral His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

Sir, "Dolphin," at Suakin, May 2, 1888.
I HAVE the honour to report to your Royal Highness that since my last general letter, dated the 18th April, 1888, the following have been the movements of Her Majesty's ships:—

The "Racer" left for Suez on the 19th April; sailing orders inclosed.

The "Dolphin" and "Albacore" remain for the defence of the port.

On the 21st April, a party of rebel horsemen made a raid on the cattle on the south side of the town, where they killed two shepherds and carried off two women; they afterwards came round to the west side, where they had a hand-to-hand engagement with some of the friendlies, wounding one severely; he has since died.

We fired three Shrapnel shell, which drove them off.

The rebels had been in the habit of coming down at night close to the water-forts, and from very good shelter, considerably annoying the garrison with their rifle fire. On the 22nd we assisted the military to lay an observation mine at that spot; it was exploded that same night.

It is impossible to tell the result, as they always carry off their killed and wounded; but the body of one man was found some way out in the desert, and there were evident signs of several others being hit.

On the 25th the rebels came at night to pull up sleepers from the railway about 2,500 yards from the ship; finding this continued, we laid a mechanical mine, arranged to explode when the next sleeper was removed.

A gun loaded with Shrapnel was also laid on the spot; at 8.50 P.M. on the 27th the mine exploded, and three rounds were rapidly fired at the spot.

The next day we found unmistakable evidence that a number of men had been hit, a camel they had left behind being captured.

The ship being in telephonic communication with the forts, we have been able to make several very effective shots at night, all distances being accurately known.

Sheik Abu Girgeh has arrived with his reinforcements from Kassala: if an attack is made, it is thought it will take place before Ramadan, which begins on the 12th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEVILLE.

No. 59.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 8, 4.10 P.M.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, June 8, 1888.*

FOLLOWING from Cookson:—

"Sir E. Vincent tells me that Nubar Pasha is out, and that Riaz Pasha has been sent for. Will you come here?"

I am entirely unaware of the immediate cause of this crisis. I go to Alexandria this evening.

No. 60.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 9, 1 P.M.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) *Alexandria, June 9, 1888, 11.40 A.M.*

I SAW the Khedive late last night. It appears that, at and after a meeting of Council on Thursday evening, he had some high words with Nubar Pasha about certain changes which the latter wished to introduce into the Financial Department, and which the Khedive opposed. But the [? Khedive] explained to me that this was only one of a series of events which had led him to dismiss Nubar Pasha. He complained of Nubar's constant intrigues, impracticability of temper, and disrespectful attitude to himself. He especially instanced a case of minor importance on its own merits, in

which Nubar Pasha, after having openly agreed to the view of Financial Department, secretly advised the Khedive to veto it. He pointed out that it was impossible to work the machine of Government in Egypt in this spirit. He said that Nubar's native colleagues were much discontented with him. He gave me a translation of the letter he had addressed to Nubar signifying his dismissal.

Riaz Pasha has accepted the task of forming a Ministry.

The situation is not one which for the moment appears to require any very active advice or interference on my part; but I mentioned to the Khedive that, as Riaz was Minister at the time of the Dual Control, it might be as well that he should fully realize the changed nature of the present situation. The relations between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government were most friendly, as also were my relations with the French Consul-General; but, under existing circumstances, it must be clearly understood that the influence of Her Majesty's Government must be paramount in Egypt, and could not be shared with any other Government, however friendly. His Highness fully agreed, and said that Riaz quite understood this.

The French Consul-General, with whom I travelled to Alexandria yesterday, is evidently much pleased at the prospect of Riaz's assuming office.

No. 61.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received by telegraph, June 9.)

(No. 226. Ext. 96.)

My Lord,

Alexandria, June 9, 1888

WITH reference to my telegram No. 95 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that, upon my arrival at Alexandria last night, I was at once received in audience by the Khedive.

It appears that at, and after a meeting of the Council of Ministers on Thursday morning, His Highness had some high words with Nubar Pasha about certain changes which the latter wished to introduce into the Financial Department, and which the Khedive opposed. His Highness explained to me, however, that this was only one of a series of events which had led him to dismiss Nubar Pasha from office. He complained of Nubar Pasha's constant intrigues, impracticable temper, and disrespectful attitude to himself. He especially instanced a case, of minor importance on its own merits, in which Nubar Pasha, after having openly agreed to the view of the Financial Department, secretly advised him to veto it. He pointed out that it was impossible to work the machine of Government in Egypt in this spirit. He further said that Nubar Pasha's native colleagues were much discontented with him. His Highness then gave me a translation of the letter, copy of which is inclosed herewith, which he had addressed to Nubar Pasha signifying his dismissal.

Riaz Pasha has accepted the task of forming a Ministry.

The situation is not one which, for the moment, appears to require any very active advice or interference on my part, but I mentioned to the Khedive that as Riaz Pasha had been Minister at the time of the Dual Control, it might be as well that he should fully realize the changed nature of the present situation. The relations between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government were most friendly, as also were my relations with the French Consul-General; but under existing circumstances it must be clearly understood that the influence of Her Majesty's Government must be paramount in Egypt, and could not be shared with any other Government however friendly. His Highness fully agreed, and said that Riaz Pasha quite understood this.

Count d'Aubigny, with whom I travelled to Alexandria yesterday, is evidently much pleased at the prospect of Riaz Pasha assuming office.

I have had the honour to telegraph the above information to your Lordship this morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 61.

His Highness the Khedive to Nubar Pasha.

Excellence, *Alexandria, June 8, 1888.*
 APRÈS l'incident très regrettable qui s'est produit hier, en la présence de vos collègues, à la suite du Conseil tenu sous ma présidence, et vu le désaccord qui s'est manifesté entre moi et votre Excellence, au sujet de questions de la plus haute importance, je crois de mon devoir de vous faire connaître que je me trouve dans l'impossibilité, à mon grand regret, de vous maintenir plus longtemps dans vos fonctions.
 (Signé) MEHEMET TEWFIK.

No. 62.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 10, 11.45 A.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

RIAZ PASHA has constituted his Ministry.

Alexandria, June 10, 1888.

No. 63.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 11.)

E
 (No. 209. Secret.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 2, 1888.

YOUR Lordship is aware that when Count d'Aubigny came here the strongest assurances were given of the desire of the French Government to work cordially with Her Majesty's Government with respect to all minor matters connected with Egyptian policy.

I am happy to say that my personal relations with Count d'Aubigny have been excellent. I must also do him the credit to say that, so far as I have been able to judge, his attitude has been very conciliatory. He has certainly done nothing to aggravate any local differences which may have arisen between the English and French authorities in Egypt.

But whatever may be Count d'Aubigny's personal views, I fear, from all I have been able to ascertain, that there is little change in the general attitude of the French Government in connection with Egyptian affairs.

As an instance of the accuracy of this assertion, I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to what has recently occurred in connection with the Decree for the creation of the reserve fund (see my despatch No. 103 of the 14th March last). This Decree was approved by the Commissioners of the Debt, and all the Great Powers, except France and Russia, have expressed their adhesion to it. A short time ago an article appeared in the "Journal des Débats," strongly criticizing the Decree. This article was no doubt written or inspired by M. de Blignières, who is a great personal friend of M. Charmes. I now learn from a very trustworthy source, not only that the French Government is disposed to refuse its adhesion to the Decree, but also that a note was communicated to the French Ambassadors at Vienna and Berlin somewhat in the sense of the article in the "Journal des Débats." Strong representations were made by the French Ambassadors at both these Courts to induce the German and Austrian Governments to oppose the Decree. These representations were, in both instances, unproductive of result, and I am informed that M. Herbette especially was told that even if the German Government had not already adhered to the Decree they would certainly do so, as they considered the arguments in its favour conclusive.

I should add that I understand that M. le Chevalier, the French Commissioner of the Caisse, has been blamed by his Government for so readily consenting to this Decree. This is possibly one of the reasons which make M. le Chevalier particularly obstructive as regards the Professional Tax and the Stamp Laws. These two subjects have now been under discussion by the Commissioners of the Caisse for some while, but, so far as I am able to judge, there is at present but little prospect of unanimity amongst the Commissioners, and still less prospect of the conclusions at which they may perhaps arrive being accepted by the Egyptian Government.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) E. BARING.

No. 64.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 211.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 2, 1888.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 370 of the 21st June, 1887, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Judgment delivered by the Mixed Court of Appeal at Alexandria confirming the decision of the Court of First Instance with regard to the claim brought against the Egyptian Government by certain Greek owners of liquor shops at Assouan.

The satisfactory conclusion come to with regard to this action is in great measure due to the ability shown by M. Dilberoglou in conducting the case before the Tribunals.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Judgment.

ATTENDU que c'est à bon droit et par une saine appréciation des faits et circonstances de la cause que le Tribunal a rejeté les demandes de Pythagoras Chion (et consorts);

Qu'il y a lieu de confirmer le Jugement par adoption de motifs;

Attendu que c'est à tort que le Tribunal du Caire a sursis à statuer sur la demande d'Ange Limbéos jusqu'à plus ample instance;

Que le mal fondé de cette demande basée, aux termes de l'acte introductif d'instance, sur les dommages qui seraient résultés pour le demandeur de la démolition de son café à Assouan (200%) de la perte de l'agencement du café et des marchandises qui s'y trouvaient (200%) et fondée de plus sur l'indemnité d'une livre sterling pour frais de séjour et autres à partir du jour des actes dommageables jusqu'à la solution définitive du litige, résulte des faits et circonstances de la cause, ainsi que des pièces au dossier;

Attendu en ce qui concerne spécialement les dommages réclamés par Ange Limbéos, en raison de la prétendue perte de marchandises, de la prétendue perte de son commerce et de l'indemnité d'une livre par jour qui lui serait due jusqu'à la solution du litige, que le Jugement attaqué, dans ses motifs que la Cour adopte et qui sont applicables à Ange Limbéos, à l'égard des chefs de demande sus-indiqués, établit, à suffisance de droit, que la fermeture des débits de boisson à Assouan, ainsi que les pertes qui ont pu en résulter pour leurs propriétaires, ne sauraient, dans les conditions dans lesquelles la fermeture a eu lieu, à diligence de l'autorité militaire Anglaise, par les Agents du Gouvernement Égyptien et dans les conditions dans lesquelles les prétendues pertes se seraient produites, engager la responsabilité de ce dernier;

Attendu en ce qui concerne les dommages qui seraient résultés pour Ange Limbéos de la démolition de son café, que ces dommages ne sauraient pas davantage engager la responsabilité du dit Gouvernement soit que cette démolition ait eu lieu par le fait des Agents du Gouvernement à la suite des mesures contre les débitants de boissons, soit qu'il y ait été procédé par l'autorité militaire Anglaise à l'occasion des travaux de construction du quai à Assouan, du moment qu'il résulte des pièces du dossier que le café dont s'agit a été construit par Ange Limbéos sans autorisation préalable sur une partie d'une place publique d'Assouan par lui usurpée; qu'il résulte, d'ailleurs, des constatations faites par l'expert judiciaire, que l'établissement d'Ange Limbéos, évalué en dehors de son agencement à 200% par son propriétaire, n'avait qu'une valeur de P. T. 420 et consistait dans une guérite, adossée aux murs de la Zaptieh d'Assouan et de la maison occupée par Anarghiros Limbéos, fermée du côté de la place publique par une mur en briques crues, entourée d'une palissade grossière et couverte avec des débris de vieilles caisses en bois;

Qu'il y a lieu, en conséquence de réformer sur l'appel principal d'Ange Limbéos et sur l'appel incident du Gouvernement Égyptien le Jugement du 20 Juin, 1887, et de rejeter d'ores et déjà la demande d'Ange Limbéos;

Attendu que les appelants se sont bornés à demander un renvoi, sans prendre de conclusions au fond;

Par ces motifs :

Statuant par défaut des appelants, faute de conclure, les déclare mal fondés en leur appel et les rejette;

Faisant droit, au contraire, à l'appel incident du Gouvernement et réformant, quant à ce, le Jugement du Tribunal du Caire du 20 Juin, 1887, déboute Ange Limbéos de sa demande et le condamne solidairement avec les autres appelants aux frais de Première Instance et d'Appel;

Taxe à P. T. 1,000 les honoraires de la défense du Gouvernement devant la Cour;
Prononcé le 28 Avril, 1888.

No. 65.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 212.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 2, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a Memorandum prepared by Mr. Clarke, in which a comparison is instituted between the present condition of the agricultural population of Egypt and their condition under the rule of Ismaïl Pasha.

Mr. Clarke has carefully studied this subject, and I venture to think that his observations will be read with interest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 65.

Memorandum by Mr. F. S. Clarke.

CONSIDERING the important political events and radical administrative changes which have taken place in an essentially agricultural country like Egypt in the last ten or fifteen years, it may not, I think, be without interest to endeavour to trace what has been during that period the improvement in the condition of the fellaheen.

The enormous increase of the country's debt brought on by the reckless extravagance of Ismaïl Pasha, the interference of the Powers to prevent total bankruptcy, the deposition of the late Khedive, the accession of Tewfik Pasha, the institution of the dual control, the revolution under Arabi, and the British occupation of the country, all followed in quick succession, and affected the condition of the fellaheen above that of all other classes of society.

In order to trace what improvement has taken place, I propose to examine first the condition of the peasant during the last few years of Ismaïl Pasha's reign, and then to note, as consecutively and as briefly as possible, the various measures of reform which have been passed, with a view to ameliorating the condition of the fellah, and to relieving him of the burdens which so heavily oppressed him.

The facts which I have collected on this subject are all contained in the numerous official documents drawn up for the Egyptian Government at the time of the Commission of Inquiry, the reports of the Controllers-General, and the various reports and despatches which have from time to time been addressed to the Foreign Office by Her Majesty's Representatives in this country. To these facts I have added such information as I have been able to obtain from other sources, and more especially such as has been furnished me by the kindness of Sir E. Vincent, Yacoub Artin Pasha, M. Rabino, &c.

In order to understand more clearly the condition of the fellaheen during the last few years of Ismaïl Pasha's reign, it is necessary to give a brief narrative up to that date of the tenure of land in Egypt, and of the various Ministerial decisions, enactments, and Decrees successively issued with regard to taxation in this country.*

According to Mussulman law all kharadji lands, that is, lands held from the State on payment of rent (kharadji), were the property of the "Beit-el-Mal," or "Public Domain."

The cultivators had, therefore, merely the usufruct. The right of inheritance did not exist, but the law gave preference to the heirs of a deceased holder if they were in a position to pay the taxes.

The documents relating to the assessment of the land revenue prior to 1846 afford

* "Rapport sur les documents relatifs à l'Impôt Foncier," par Boutros Bey Ghali. "Right of Landed Property in Egypt," by Yacoub Artin Pasha.

but little information on the subject. It would appear, however, that the land tax in 1824 was fixed at from 60 to 70 piastres a feddan, that the professional tax was added to the land tax before the year 1834, and that an increase of taxation occurred in 1839. A Decree enacting certain measures with regard to the mortgaging of lands and to the taxation of the produce was issued in 1846, and was amended in 1854. By this latter enactment a certain quantity of land had to be given to any one returning to his village, the "firda" or tax on produce was added to the land tax, "hodgets" or legal title-deeds of possession were introduced, and male heirs acquired the right to inherit the estate, while female heirs could claim a share on proof of their having no other means of subsistence and on payment of the taxes. In 1856 an enactment of Saïd Pasha reduced the land tax to an average of from 90 to 100 piastres per feddan. In 1859 a tenant was authorized to abandon to the State such lands in his possession as he was unable to cultivate, but a few years later this authorization was withdrawn by order of Ismaïl Pasha. In the following year an enactment was issued prescribing the classification of lands according to their quality, and fixing the assessment of the land tax on an equitable scale, at the average rate of from 60 to 70 piastres per feddan. This measure was, however, most imperfectly carried out. The only regular law passed with regard to the tenure of kharadji lands was that which was promulgated in 1858, and which still forms the basis of the laws by which such lands are held. Its chief articles were:—

1. Right of succession to the estate without distinction of sex in parts apportioned according to Mussulman law.
2. Right of possession of the estate after five years' regular payment of taxes.
3. Right on the part of the tenant to mortgage his estate, or to lease it for three years, with power to renew the lease.
4. Right of the State to expropriate a tenant on grounds of public utility without compensation. The Mudirs were, however, instructed to make up for such expropriations by the grant of certain lands in the same "commune."
5. Absolute right of property to tenants on whose lands there were trees, buildings, or water-pumps.

6. Remission of all taxation in the event of the soil being carried away by the Nile without an equivalent deposit having been formed in some other place.

In 1861 a Decree was issued increasing the land-tax by about 5 per cent. Two years later a further Decree fixed the land-tax in Lower Egypt as from 45 piastres to 115 piastres per feddan, and that in Upper Egypt at from 20 piastres to 110 piastres per feddan.

A general classification of lands according to their quality, and an equitable assessment of the land-tax, was ordered in 1868. In the three following years taxation was first increased by one-sixth, and then by 10 per cent., to cover expenses incurred by the Government in irrigation works.

In 1871 we find that the land-tax had reached a maximum rate of 174 piastres per feddan in Lower Egypt, and of 154 piastres in Upper Egypt.

The Ouchoury lands, or those which were granted on condition of their being brought into cultivation, and which were originally only charged with a quit rent called the "dime" or "ouchour," were first taxed in 1855. The assessment was low, varying from 10 piastres to 26 piastres in Lower Egypt, from 8 piastres to 20 piastres in Upper Egypt. These lands were, however, gradually subjected to an increase of taxation, until in 1871 a maximum of 83 piastres a feddan in Lower Egypt and 57 piastres in Upper Egypt was reached.

It was at this period that the Law of the Moukabala was passed.

According to this Law, any landed proprietor could, by paying a sum equal to six times the amount of his land-tax, reduce by one-half in perpetuity the amount of the land-tax he had hitherto paid. The payments had to be made in advance by certain fixed yearly instalments. The Moukabala was, in fact, an "anticipated land-tax," and became, in most instances, of a compulsory nature. It conferred, however, absolute right of property in the land upon all those who had completed payment of it.

In connection with this account of the land-tax, it may be convenient to furnish here a few remarks respecting the imposition of the tax or tithe on date trees.

It is not known when this tax was first instituted. In 1860 we find that it consisted in a fee levied at a sum varying from 20 paras to 2½ piastres per tree.

In 1868 a Decree mentions that lands planted with date trees must also pay tithe on the yield of all such trees. The Decrees of 1868 and 1871, which raised the land-tax by one-sixth, also added one-sixth to the tithe on date trees.

Towards 1880 this tax showed a difference in its assessment varying from 1½ piastres to 14 piastres per tree.

Condition of the Fellaheen at the close of Ismaïl Pasha's Reign.

Much has been written of the misery and of the oppression formerly endured by the fellah. The courbash, the corvée, the bribery and extortion on the part of the Mudirs and the village Sheikhs, the injustice of the incidence of the land-tax, the hardship of the military conscription, and the corrupt management of the Irrigation Department, are all mentioned as having contributed to render the condition of the peasant one of almost unparalleled poverty and wretchedness. But the mere mention of these principal causes of distress is not sufficient fully to appreciate that condition. It is only by an investigation, cursory though it be, into the evil system of government prevalent some ten or fifteen years ago, that an idea is gained of the really abject state of the fellah at the close of the last reign.

To begin with, taxation was not at that time established on any basis. It was not proportionate either to the quality of the land or to the capability of each respective individual to pay it. Up to the year 1871 taxation was imposed merely by a Khedivial Decree issued on the advice of the Ministers, or upon the strength of a Ministerial decision alone, and though after that date laws regulating the assessment of the land-tax were passed, they were but little regarded, and the Government ordered a collection of taxes whenever the needs of the Treasury required it. The fellah called upon to pay his taxes by the Mudir or village Sheikh was perfectly ignorant of the law by which such a collection was made. All he knew was, that it was an order that emanated from the Government, and that he had therefore no means of redress. No regard was had for the convenience of the taxpayer. If he could not produce the money, he was obliged to sell his standing crops at half their value, or to borrow money from the Greek or Jewish usurer at from 4 to 7 per cent. a-month. If the sale of the crops did not suffice to pay the requisite contribution, he was forced to sell his cattle, and eventually to part with the land itself, on the produce of which he was endeavouring to subsist. Such cases became frequent when, upon the unification of the Debt in 1876, the dates of the falling due of the coupons were, for a time, fixed for the 15th January and the 15th July, that is, before the winter harvest of grain had been reaped, and the summer crops, more especially those of cotton, had been gathered in.

The fellah paid his taxes by order of the Mudir or Sheikh of the village. The Central Government kept no supervision over these functionaries. The lands of the weak were consequently over-taxed to make up for any deficit of the taxes due from those who were more favoured, or who were too powerful to be forced to pay their share of the aggregate amount. The exaction of taxes was, in fact, carried on in a most arbitrary manner, and imprisonment and the courbash were freely inflicted to enforce payment. The state of things revealed in the case of an action brought against an agent of a Company—a Greek, of the name of Pappadopoulos—throws a strong light on the iniquities perpetrated on the small peasant proprietor at that period. This agent was in the habit of buying the crops of corn and cotton without the consent of the owners and of paying the price to the village accountant, or else of giving the owners themselves worthless receipts for such purchases. The crops were gathered by force, generally in the presence of the village Sheikh, who was himself in debt to Pappadopoulos, and therefore entirely in his power. Any opposition on the part of the cultivator, who was thus arbitrarily forced to sell his crops, often under their value, was punished by a term of imprisonment or by gross ill-usage inflicted by Pappadopoulos himself.

But the abuses in connection with the collection of taxes were not confined to the Mudirs and Sheikhs alone. The "sarrafs" or village accountants, to whom payment of the taxes had, as a rule, to be made, were not in receipt of any fixed remuneration for their services. Their wages did not, it appears, in some cases, exceed the yearly sum of 3*l*. They were, however, allowed a further wage on their collections, and this system was naturally fraught with results alike ruinous to the taxpayer and to the interests of the revenue. These accountants were appointed by the provincial authorities, and the Ministry of Finance was even, in most cases, ignorant of their very names.

Corruption and the acceptance of bribes, as Sir E. Baring has pointed out,* has always been considered a venial offence in Egypt, and at that time the Government positively encouraged dishonesty. It was impossible to expect that a badly paid and uneducated official with his salary in arrear should refrain from taking bribes, or from exacting the utmost from the taxpayer whom he held in his power.

In an agricultural country like Egypt all taxes ultimately fall upon the product of the land, and one is not therefore surprised to find how heavily taxes like the professional tax, the salt tax, the tithe on date trees, &c., weighed on the small peasant proprietor.

* See Blue Book, "Egypt No. 15 (1885)," Reports on the state of Egypt, p. 10.

These taxes were, for the most part, not allowed to vary from year to year. The same amount had to be paid, whether the number of inhabitants of a village had decreased or not, or whether the date trees, which had been taxed perhaps some seven or eight years ago, still existed, or had all been cut down. The salt tax, which had become a capitation tax, was especially heavy, and reached at one time the amount of 9 piastres per head on all over the age of 6 years. The professional tax, which was supposed to be levied only on those engaged in some industry, was, as a matter of fact, exacted from the peasant proprietor, whose sole occupation was the cultivation of his fields, and this indiscriminate application of the tax was severely felt by many of the smaller land-owners. In 1875 a capitation tax was levied, and gave rise to great abuses. We find, moreover, that smaller taxes of a most vexatious character like octroi in villages, taxes on weighing, on the sale of cattle, market dues, &c., were levied with hardly any profit to the State. Of these the octroi in the villages, while putting a stop to any small commerce that might have arisen, cost almost more in the collection than the amount realized.

The passing of the Moukabala Law was, as regards the peasant proprietor, the most ruinous measure of Ismaïl's reign. Although it was supposed to be a voluntary transaction between the landed proprietor and the State, whereby (as has been already mentioned), after payment of a sum equal to six times the amount of his land-tax, the former reduced his yearly taxation in the future by one-half, it became in practice compulsory, and ruined many thousands.

The fellah who had managed perhaps with difficulty to pay the amount of his land-tax was suddenly called upon to pay it a second time in the same year. The result was, that he was forced to borrow from the usurer, and eventually to fall hopelessly into debt. In some instances the Moukabala was exacted from the cultivator, who had not even the means to pay his land-tax in full. This added considerably to the arrears in the land revenue, and to the general indebtedness of the peasant. An arrangement was come to in 1880 by which it was decided to pay back a certain portion of the money raised by the Moukabala. It is estimated, however, that the total loss inflicted upon the tax payer between the years 1871 and 1878 by the application of the law amounted to £ E. 6,762,000. It will be seen that upon the abolition of the Moukabala the taxes of those who had paid it in full were again raised to their former rate, and it is hard to believe that the Government had at any time the intention to rest by their agreement, that the land-tax of those who had conformed to this law should be reduced by one-half in perpetuity.

Forced to borrow money at almost any rate of interest, the fellah found to his cost that the introduction of the international Tribunals in 1876 afforded him great facilities for doing so. The European usurer was naturally far more ready to lend money on land which had now become a first-class security, and which, upon a decision of the Courts, he had the power to force the proprietor to sell in order to pay the sum advanced. Doubtless, too, advantage was taken of the ignorance of the fellah in the ways of the law to obtain decisions of expropriation before it was absolutely necessary, and before he had been irremediably ruined. The indebtedness of the fellah accordingly increased in the next few years to an almost incredible extent. Lord Dufferin, in his Report, states that in six years, commencing from 1876, the amount inscribed on the Table of Mortgages rose from £ E. 500,000 to £ E. 7,000,000, of which £ E. 5,000,000 was inscribed in the name of the fellaheen.

"A vast proportion of this capital sum," writes Lord Dufferin, "represented not the original charge but the accumulated interest, the usual rate of which is 3 per cent. per month, or 36 per cent. per annum." Nor did this sum of £ E. 5,000,000 represent the whole amount of the indebtedness of the fellaheen. A further sum of from £ E. 3,000,000 to £ E. 4,000,000 was owing by him to the village usurers.

The hardship of the military conscription, from all that can be gathered on the subject, was at this period extremely great. Conscription for the army appears like taxation, to have been entirely arbitrary, and to have rested solely with the Mudirs and Sheikhs of the village. Exemption from the service was indeed fixed at the high rate of 80*l*., and it was also possible for a soldier to purchase his discharge at a rate increasing according to the number of years he had served under the colours, but it is doubtful whether many availed themselves of such a dearly-bought privilege. At that time there was not, it must be remembered, any guarantee that the payment of such exemptions would be held binding by the authorities. No limit was assigned to the length of service, the number of men summoned was much greater than that of the present day, and the regiments were stationed not only in Egypt proper, but also in the Soudan, where service was looked upon with the utmost dread.

The Mudirs and Sheikhs called upon to furnish a certain number of men naturally

first eliminated their own friends and relations from those liable to service. No account was taken of age or marriage, or of sums previously paid for exemption. Men who were unable to give sufficient bribes to the authorities were pressed into the service. It sometimes happened that the recruiting officer came to the same village twice in one year, and each time some luckless individual was given up to him regardless of all law and justice.

If a soldier deserted, his relations, who were made responsible for him, were obliged to furnish two substitutes to the army chosen from among themselves, while in the event of there being no relations the village became itself responsible. An instance is recorded where a village was by this system held responsible for four deserters.

The hardship of the military conscription was fully equalled, if not surpassed, by the burden imposed upon the peasant by the *corvée*.

So much has been written on the subject, and the misery inflicted on the helpless labourer has been described so often and in such vivid colours, that it is scarcely necessary to dilate at any length upon the influence it exercised on the condition of the fellahen. It may not, however, be out of place to quote here Lord Northbrook's description of the working of the *corvée*:-

"Under this system," he says, "thousands of persons were forcibly employed every year without pay, without any provision of food, without any proper tools, or any organization of labour, and often far from their homes, where they can derive no advantage from their labour; and this system, hard enough if it had been justly worked, and the burden had been divided between the rich and the poor, has been so unjustly carried out that the rich have almost entirely escaped from any contribution either in money or in labour, while the poor have borne it all."

It was the consciousness of the injustice of the working of the *corvée* that rendered it such a burden to the fellah. He well knew that his labour was required for the general benefit of the land; that without it cultivation would cease, and distress and ruin would ensue upon him and his neighbours; but what was most galling was to see that the rich Pashas and his more influential neighbours were, through fear or bribery, enabled to evade the *corvée* service, and that, while he was dragged from his home and his fields to work in some distant part of the country, they were left in peace to cultivate their lands and reap the benefit of the labour which men as unfortunate as himself were forced to give. It is not, I think, possible to exaggerate the injustice of the *corvée* system, or the waste of time and labour which followed in its course when its management was in the hands of irresponsible and corrupt officials. Nor was forced labour then used for the public interest alone. It was employed besides for the cultivation of the vast estates of Ismail Pasha, calculated at something like 900,000 feddans in area. If sufficient numbers were not forthcoming for such purposes, a fine at the rate of 10 piastres per feddan was exacted from the peasant proprietor in lieu of the labour demanded from each village.

The stimulus given to the cultivation of cotton by the high prices obtainable at the time of the American civil war, and the introduction of the growth of sugar on a large scale, had greatly increased the value of labour and the profit derived from land. The system of irrigation known as "*sefi*," which is necessary for the growth of cotton, required constant work and attention, and the rich cultivator, therefore, did everything in his power to prevent his tenants and labourers from being called out by the *corvée*. The required numbers had, consequently, to be furnished by the poorer fellahen, whose own time and labour had also become more valuable. Statistics as to the numbers called out yearly for the *corvée* up to 1878 are not forthcoming. In the years 1878, 1879, and 1880 it is estimated that 188,000 men were summoned, and that of these 112,000, on an average, were annually employed for the space of five or six months during low Nile. In addition to these numbers, a great many more were employed as watchmen along the banks during high Nile.

Intimately connected with the *corvée* is the question of irrigation upon which the fertility of the soil and therefore the wealth of Egypt depends.

All accounts of the time with which we are dealing concur in representing the Irrigation Department as being then a free field for abuses and gross mismanagement.

The principal abuses occurred in the practical working of the system. The native engineers had almost arbitrary powers as regards the regulations concerning the construction of dams, sluices, and pumps, and they naturally carried out such works for the convenience of the richer and more influential proprietors, who, doubtless, well repaid them for their services. Here, again, owing to the prevalence of corruption and the want of proper supervision, the poor suffered, and the quantity of water obtainable for the fields depended on the means at the disposal of the proprietor wherewith to bribe

the venal officials with whom the power of distribution rested. Lord Dufferin mentions the instance of one man who made £ E. 15,000 a-year by the sale of water. Such cases were, it would seem, at that time by no means rare. Added to all this, the inexperience and carelessness of the engineers were a constant source of danger to the country, and rendered the destruction of the crops through overflowing or through drought a matter of not unfrequent occurrence.

The extortion practised on the peasant in those days would, it may be thought, have discouraged him from acquiring habits of thrift, or from hoarding the little money which he could put by after payment of his taxes, and after providing himself and his family with the necessaries of life. In many instances, however, such was not the case. Nor is the reason hard to find, when it is remembered that the price of the produce of the land, and more especially that of cotton and wheat, was at that period considerably higher than it is now. We consequently find that in the Delta where the fertility of the soil is greater, the fellah was sometimes enabled to save money and to keep it, notwithstanding the usurer and the application of the *courbash*. The proof of this statement is shown by the amount of gold which was yearly absorbed by the country. This amount was equivalent at the very close of Ismail's reign to about 1,000,000*l.* per annum. Another proof of the hoarding of wealth was the production by the fellah when driven to the last extremity of various old gold coins, which had been either buried in the ground for many years, or which had been used as ornaments by the women. But, although this shows that the distress among the small owners of the rich lands of the Delta was not as great as might have been expected, the case of the fellahen in the provinces of Upper Egypt was far different. There the peasant was steeped in the utmost poverty, and the destruction of his crops at once meant famine in the land. Such a famine actually occurred when the unusually low Nile of 1877, which left much of the arable land unirrigated, was succeeded in the following year by an extremely high Nile, destroying a considerable amount of the doura crop by flooding.

Mr. A. Baird, who was sent to Upper Egypt at the time to report upon the causes of the famine, and so afford assistance to the starving peasant, stated that the poverty in the three provinces of Girgeh, Keneh, and Esneh, was entirely owing to the great pressure which had been put upon the fellah in 1878 in order to pay the coupon due in May of that year. He mentioned as a fact that to be enabled to pay his taxes the small proprietor had been, in many instances, obliged to sell his corn for 50 piastres per ardeb, while the crop was still standing, the same corn being worth, when it was delivered a month later, 120 piastres per ardeb. In one place he found that though the price of doura was 80 piastres per ardeb, the peasants themselves, having no money, were buying it on credit at 170 piastres per ardeb. It was in fact a money famine, as it was almost always possible to procure food on the spot if the money had only been forthcoming. Merchants seeing the failure of the crops had made large purchases of corn, and had stored it up with a view to forcing up prices. The worst period of famine was in the months of September, October, November, and December, 1878, and though there were no statistics kept of the deaths from starvation the numbers might, Mr. Baird thought, be taken at about 10,000, while many more perished from dysentery and other diseases, brought on by scarcity of proper food. Mr. Baird stated in conclusion that unless something was done to relieve the people of those provinces of their debts, another failure of the crops would inevitably bring on another famine of the same terrible nature.

It would not be just to close this description of the condition of the fellahen during the latter portion of Ismail Pasha's reign without alluding to some of the benefits bestowed by the ex-Khedive on the country, and indirectly on the peasant. Foremost among them stands the improved system of constant irrigation completed by him in Lower and Middle Egypt, whereby it was rendered possible to cultivate valuable crops of cotton, sugar, and maize. Statistics collected from trustworthy sources show that during the first ten years of Ismail's reign, that is, from 1863 to 1873, the quantity of cotton annually exported increased from 814,950 cwt., valued at £ E. 6,503,308, to 2,104,254 cwt., valued at £ E. 10,070,631, while the value of cotton annually exported from 1873 until 1879 averaged roughly at from £ E. 7,000,000 to £ E. 8,000,000.

The increase in the quantity of sugar exported from 1863 to 1873 is still more remarkable, whereas in 1863 the quantity exported was only 6,717 cwt., of the value of £ E. 7,820, the quantity in 1873 had reached 809,890 cwt., valued at £ E. 827,175. During the last five years of Ismail's reign the quantity ranged annually from over 500,000 cwt. to nearly 800,000 cwt., varying roughly in value from about £ E. 400,000 to over £ E. 800,000.

In addition to the increase given to the productiveness of the land, Ismail Pasha opened up the resources of the country by causing the Ibrahimieh Canal, over 90 miles in

length, to be dug, by building nearly 1,000 miles of railway, and by erecting the sugar refineries, which give remunerative employment to many thousands of labourers.

All these benefits were, however, dearly bought when it is remembered that Ismaïl Pasha in his fifteen years' reign had raised the public debt of Egypt to over £ E. 90,000,000.

Commencement of Reforms.

The Decree issued on the recommendations of Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert in November 1876 marks the commencement of reform in Egypt. By this Decree, the Commission of the Public Debt (which had been instituted a few months previous) was rendered permanent until the entire redemption of the Debt, while the functions of the Commissioners themselves were greatly strengthened. A system of European control was also established for the first time by the appointment of an English and a French Controller-General, the one for Receipts, and the other for Accounts and the Public Debt. An Englishman was, moreover, named President of the Railways Administration, and other important posts were likewise intrusted to Europeans of high character and standing.

This first step to reform was followed in 1878 by the appointment by Ismaïl Pasha, under strong pressure from the Great Powers, of a Commission of Inquiry. This Commission was instituted by a Decree issued in January 1878, and was composed of Riaz Pasha, of Sir C. Rivers Wilson, and of the four Commissioners of the Public Debt, under the nominal Presidency of M. de Lesseps. Its object was to examine into the deficits of the revenue, to verify the existent abuses in the administration of the laws regarding taxation, and to suggest remedies for the defective system of government. The labours of the Commission resulted in the abolition, by a Decree dated the 17th January, 1880, of about twenty-nine taxes, the greater part of which had been of a most vexatious character, and had brought but little into the Treasury. Among these taxes was the personal tax, the most inequitable of all in its incidence, the tax on wool, the tax on the sale of cattle at Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez, the tax on the weighing of goods, the tax on pottery, the octroi duty in villages, &c. This Decree further exempted all cultivators of land from payment of the professional tax, and remitted under certain conditions all arrears of the land-tax due prior to the year 1876. In order to make good, however, the loss entailed on the revenue by the suppression of such taxes, the land-tax on the Ouchoury lands was increased by a sum of £ E. 150,000 a-year.

Many other reforms took place in 1880 consequent upon the recommendations contained in the reports of the Commission of Inquiry and under the supervision of the two Controllers-General. The Law of the Moukabala was abolished, the Government undertaking to pay the contributors a certain indemnity, and recognizing the absolute right of property in the lands to all those who had paid the Moukabala, either wholly or in part. To make up the deficit in the Budget, however, the taxes of those who had paid it were again raised to their former rate, the revenue from the land-tax being thus increased by £ E. 1,100,000. A Committee was appointed for the revision of the land-tax, based on a new survey. The Finance Ministry published certain general principles upon which rests the assessment of the land-tax in Egypt, of which the most important features were that the land-tax is due by the land itself, and that recovery of arrears of taxes is secured to the State by the seizure of the yield of the land, the State having priority over all other creditors. Foreigners were also forced to pay the land-tax which they had formerly evaded doing. The country was divided into Upper and Lower Egypt, and the tax-payer in the upper provinces was ordered to pay his taxes in money, payment of the land revenue in kind having given rise to many abuses. The taxes could no longer be paid to the village accountant, or the Mudirich, or the Finance Ministry indiscriminately. All payments had to be made to the "Sarraf" alone, who was put under proper supervision, and whose salary was fixed at a higher rate, while his percentage on the taxes collected was decreased by 10 per cent. Each taxpayer was to receive an extract from a register, showing him the total sums due from him under the several heads of taxation, and the dates on which he would have to pay them. A Decree published in this year likewise relieved cultivators to a certain extent of the necessity of borrowing money, by fixing the dates of the collection of taxes so as to coincide with the harvest. Thus, in Lower Egypt, two-thirds of the land revenue was made payable between the months of October and February, when the cotton crop had been gathered and sold, while the remaining third was collected after the sale of the summer crops in June or July. In Upper Egypt the taxes had to be paid between April and August, the time when the fellah could most readily dispose of his wheat crop.

The date tax was fixed at a uniform rate of 2½ piastres per tree, and a revision of the number of trees in each village was ordered to be made every four years. Lastly, the salt tax, which, as has been mentioned, had been by degrees commuted into a heavy capitation tax in the villages, was abolished, the Government reserving to itself the monopoly of the sale of salt. This measure was one which gave considerable relief to the fellah.

Progress under British Occupation.

The military disturbances at the commencement of 1881, and the events which followed, stayed the progress of reform for almost two years, and it was not until almost the close of 1882, when Lord Dufferin came on his mission to Egypt, that the task was once more resumed.

It is accordingly with the improvement in the condition of the fellahen since the British occupation of the country that I now propose to deal.

The first great reform introduced into this country under English influence was the suppression of the use of the courbash. It is needless to descant on the humanity of this measure, or to dwell on the advance in civilization it betokened. The Decree abolishing the courbash was issued in March 1883, and has had good results, notwithstanding the gloomy prognostications of those who maintained that it was impossible to carry on the government of the country without it. Crime and lawlessness doubtless increased for a time, the collection of taxes was rendered more difficult, and the numbers of those who responded to the corvée decreased; but all these difficulties have been gradually overcome by a better system of administration, and the suppression of the courbash remains an unmitigated blessing to the fellahen and to the country.

The next important reform was the partial abolition of the corvée. It is chiefly by comparing the numbers annually called out for forced labour since the year 1884 that we can judge of the good work which has been done since the appointment to the Irrigation Department of Colonel Sir C. Scott-Moncrieff and the staff of British officials under him. Thus we find that in 1884 the unpaid corvée labour was equivalent to 165,000 men working for 100 days; in 1885 it was reduced to the equivalent of 125,936 men working for 100 days; and in 1886 it was still further reduced to the equivalent of 95,093 men working for the same number of days. Finally, last year the number of men employed by the corvée was 87,120 for 100 days.

Nor must this reduction be ascribed, as Sir C. Scott-Moncrieff points out in his Irrigation Report for the year 1886, merely to the money grant of 250,000*l.* It is due in part to superior engineering skill, whereby a great deal of useless labour is dispensed with, and in part to the use made of the Barrage, which had been abandoned for many years, and which is now being repaired and strengthened.

Sir C. Scott-Moncrieff estimates at £ E. 380,000, or at £ E. 130,000 more than the grant of 250,000*l.*, the sum which would be required for the next two years, that is, 1888 and 1889, to entirely dispense with forced labour. In subsequent years a sum of £ E. 327,000, or £ E. 77,000 more than the present money grant, would, he thinks, suffice for the purpose.

The burden of the corvée system has further been lightened by the recent introduction of a money ransom. The rules of redemption from forced labour are as follows: Each individual who is liable to be called out for the corvée can redeem himself by paying a fixed sum of 40 piastres in the richer districts and 20 piastres in the low rice growing districts. This ransom has to be paid by the 1st April of each year. In the Province of Sharkieh, for example, the redemption was so general this year that not a single man was called for the corvée, and all the necessary works have been done by contract.

The small owners of land are all loud in their praises of the Irrigation Department, and of the justice and efficiency displayed by the officials in the supply and distribution of water. The improvements brought about in the general welfare of the country by the judicious expenditure on public works, such as irrigation and drainage, of the 1,000,000*l.* assigned for the purpose, are too well known to require repetition. In forwarding Colonel Moncrieff's Report for 1886,* Sir E. Baring bears full testimony to the beneficial reforms carried out by the Public Works Department in the last few years:—

"The whole Report," he says, "is a record of good work done, work which has already helped to ameliorate the condition of thousands of the poorer cultivators of the country. In no Department have the advantages derived from English honesty, energy, and practical skill been more clearly displayed than in that under the charge of Sir C. Scott-Moncrieff."

* Blue Book, "Egypt No. 2 (1886)," p. 56, No. 121.

The various reforms introduced into the army and into the system of military conscription have also been very great.

The power formerly exercised by the Mudirs and Sheikhs with regard to recruiting has been taken entirely out of their hands, and corruption and injustice have necessarily ceased. Commissions composed of officers (one of whom is a member of the Medical Staff) are now intrusted in the different provinces with the duty of registering all males of the prescribed age who are not found to be exempt from military service on medical or other grounds. The work of these Commissions is periodically inspected by one of the Assistant Adjutants-General at head-quarters, assisted by an English medical officer in the Egyptian service. Ten per cent. of the male population are liable to military service. Up to last year the prescribed age was between 19 and 23, and the drawing took place every five years, but since the 1st March last the drawings are appointed to take place every year, and the prescribed age has been fixed at 19. All those who after drawing are deemed fit for military service, but who are not called upon to serve, remain on the recruiting lists until the age of 27, when their names are struck off. In the event of national danger, however, all up to the age of 54 are liable to be called out for service.

It is estimated that, generally speaking, one-half of those called up escape, either by paying the "Badalich" (exemption from the drawing by lot), which has recently been reduced to £ E. 20, by being medically unfit, or by being discharged as only sons, &c. Thus, in 1886, 6,000 men being required, it was found necessary to call up 12,000. Last year again, 2,000 recruits being required, 4,000 had to be called up. The length of service at present is:—

4 years in the army.
4 „ „ police.
4 „ „ reserve.

This, however, is somewhat modified in practice, and, in order to maintain efficiency, a longer period of service in the army is undergone.

The law as to desertion has not, it is true, been materially altered. Thus, the nearest relative of a deserter is still called out to replace him. In the event of the relative being medically unfit to do so, a fine of 100*l.* is imposed upon him unless the deserter is produced within a specified time. This severe measure is, however, rendered absolutely necessary to prevent the frequent occurrence of desertions.

In 1879, the army in Egypt consisted of about 18,000 men, while that in the Soudan reached a total of 30,000. The present strength of the army is about 9,500 men. It is, therefore, easily seen how lightly the conscription now presses on the people of Egypt.

The enormous extent to which the peasant was indebted to the village usurers caused grave anxiety to the Government in 1883, and nothing, therefore, is perhaps more satisfactory to note than the gradual decrease in the last four years of this general indebtedness. The expropriations of land carried out by order of the Law Courts give a certain insight into the state of indebtedness of the country, and the following Table of the expropriations registered in the Mixed Tribunals from the years 1883 to 1886, inclusive, may therefore be useful for the purpose:—

Years.				Sums due.	Feddans.	Houses.
				£ E. m.		
1883	..	..	..	413,523 490	22,047	268
1884	..	..	..	305,482 970	18,148	252
1885	..	..	..	352,050 120	17,828	234
1886	..	..	..	235,339 000	12,968	267

It will be seen from the above Table that since 1883 there has been a continuous decrease in the amount of land expropriated. It has fallen from over 22,000 feddans in 1883 to about 13,000 feddans in 1886.

Sir Edgar Vincent, in his successive reports on the finances of Egypt for the years 1884, 1885, and 1886, makes the following statements:—

"The indebtedness of proprietors of more than 200 feddans diminished during the last six months of the year (1884) from £ E. 164,579 to £ E. 112,445, or by an amount of £ E. 52,134.

"There is no more convincing sign of improvement in the condition of Egypt during the last few years than the fact that the debts of the fellahen to local usurers have, in a great measure, been paid off. It will be remembered that, in 1882, one of the

main sources of discontent was the indebtedness of the peasantry to European usurers. The promise that they would not have to pay their creditors induced many to follow Arabi.

"In many provinces the usurers have been entirely paid off; in a few there is still a certain amount of money outstanding, but less onerous terms of interest have been agreed to, and a term of years settled for the reimbursement of the capital. The information which I have been able to collect leads me to estimate the total amount now (1886) due on account of old debts by the peasants to money lenders at less than 3,000,000*l.*, and but little fresh indebtedness has been incurred. The cases in which usurers have sold up the fellahen for non-payment are quite exceptional, and affect only an insignificant fraction of the total cultivated area of Egypt."

Again, reporting on the Budget of 1887, Sir E. Vincent says:—

"There is nothing more remarkable in the history of the last three years in Egypt than the gradual disappearance of the village money lenders. The amount of the indebtedness of the fellahen has been still further diminished during the past year. It is curious to observe that with the diminution of borrowing in the villages, the cry for land credit and for land banks has practically ceased."

The continual reduction in the indebtedness of the fellahen is the more satisfactory, when we take into account the great fall in the prices of Egyptian produce which has taken place within the last few years.

The prices of wheat, cotton, sugar, &c., have all suffered a great diminution since the year 1880. According to trustworthy statistics of the export trade, the fall in the value of cotton in the two years, 1885-86, alone was 16 per cent., that of sugar was 33 per cent., and that of wheat 6 per cent. Again, calculating the value of corn exported from the country in 1886 at the price it would have obtained in 1880, it is found that a loss of £ E. 1,753,000 is incurred by the country. A similar loss of £ E. 386,000 is incurred by the fall in the prices of sugar, while losses respectively of £ E. 481,000, £ E. 114,000, £ E. 10,000, and £ E. 32,000 are sustained by the fall in the prices of cotton seeds, beans, wheat, and rice. The total loss to Egypt, therefore, by the fall since 1880 in the prices of its principal products, amounts to no less than £ E. 2,776,000. In other words, Sir E. Vincent calculates that the fall in prices of Egyptian exports since 1880 has increased the annual charge of the Debt on the country by a sum equal to the interest at 5½ per cent. on 50,000,000*l.*, that is to say, by an extra annual charge of about 40 piastres per head on every individual member of the population.

One of the most necessary and beneficial measures carried out successfully by Sir Edgar Vincent has been the reform of the Egyptian currency. Up to 1885 the gold and silver currency of the country consisted of almost every species of foreign coin. The gold coins most in circulation were English sovereigns, French napoleons, and Egyptian and Turkish pounds; while the silver currency, which was totally insufficient for the wants of the country, and which entailed great loss on the poorer classes of the community owing to the want of small change, was supplemented by more than one-half by the importation of foreign silver specie. Of this the greater part consisted of the Maria Theresa dollar, the Colonnato or Carolus dollar, and the Medjidieh or Turkish dollar. In the larger towns, florins, shillings, sixpences, and francs also formed part of the currency. The Egyptian silver coinage was principally composed of worn-out piastre pieces.

When we consider that the rate of exchange of silver for gold often amounted to 5 per cent., and that the foreign silver which circulated in the country varied greatly in tariff, we can well conceive the profit made out of the poorer fellah in the provinces by the petty money-changer.

By the new system the Egyptian pound is the monetary unit, and is divided into 100 piastres, or 1,000 dimes. Silver coins, representing respectively 20 piastres, 10 piastres, 2 piastres, and 1 piastre have been struck, while smaller coins have been issued in nickel. The foreign silver has now almost entirely disappeared from circulation owing to the gradual reduction of its Tariff by the Government, while the employment of official money changers in most of the larger centres of trade has put a stop to the frauds formerly perpetrated on the ignorant peasant.

It has been already seen what reforms took place in 1880 and in the course of the following year with regard to taxation. Since then various other measures, all tending to assist the fellah in the payment of his land-tax, have been passed. The annual sum of 450,000*l.*, assigned by the Convention of London for the reduction of the land-tax (of which 250,000*l.* has been devoted to the partial abolition of the corvée), has done much to alleviate the burden of taxation on land. The complaint that taxation in Upper Egypt was rendered excessively heavy by the collections being made at inconvenient seasons

has been thoroughly considered, with the result that a Decree has been recently issued introducing certain modifications which will ensure the land-tax being collected in the months most convenient to the agricultural population. More might, of course, have been done in regulating the assessment of the land-tax had the work of the Cadastre or land survey proceeded more satisfactorily. Unfortunately, the progress made in this Department has been but slow, and the whole work is very far indeed from completion. Complaints as to excessive taxation are, however, daily growing less numerous.

That the national wealth is progressing is seen from the annual statistics of trade and commerce. Thus, the amount of goods imported for use in Egypt is increasing year by year. In 1885 alone the amount was 30 per cent. in excess of that imported in any previous year. The annual absorption of gold by the country also points to increased national wealth. According to Custom Returns, the average amount of gold yearly absorbed by Egypt from 1880 to 1886 amounted to £ E. 1,600,000. Quoting Sir E. Vincent, we find that "Egypt, which contains 6,000,000 of inhabitants, or $\frac{1}{10}$ th of the population of the world, absorbs $\frac{1}{10}$ th of the gold annually produced."

With regard to the progress of education among the fellahen class, Yacoub Pasha Artin has most kindly furnished me with some statistics showing the increase which has taken place since 1875 in the number of elementary schools in the villages, and of the teachers attached to them.

The following Table shows the number of such schools and teachers in 1886-87 as compared with that in 1875 :—

Elementary Schools.

Moudirich	1886-87.		1875.	
	Schools.	Teachers.	Schools.	Teachers.
Behrah	278	989	189	189
Sharkieh	639	660	507	511
Dakahlieh	717	725	110	112
Gharbi	1,055	1,182	955	962
Gharbi	215	301	191	205
Menoufieh	788	861	630	666
Assiout	689	738	283	300
Beni Souef	219	222	79	81
Esneh	341	366	150	155
Fayoum	186	188	101	101
Ghizeh	203	296	166	171
Girgeh	611	627	257	263
Keneh	424	424	113	116
Minieh	211	265	188	195
Total	6,639	7,244	4,232	4,313

It will be seen that, in twelve years, 2,407 more schools have been opened and 2,901 more teachers employed. Statistics respecting the number of pupils who attend such schools are so untrustworthy that I have deemed it useless to note them. The difficulty of obtaining a just estimate of the number of pupils at the village schools is not surprising, when it is borne in mind that attendance at school varies greatly according to the season of the year. Children are, from a very early age, employed in tending cattle and light labour in the fields. Thus, at harvest-time the schools are almost entirely deserted, while at other seasons the attendance is, from all accounts, pretty numerous. It follows naturally that education is more widespread in Upper Egypt, where there is but one crop in the year, than in the Delta, where a series of crops are annually raised, and this fact is fully borne out by the above Table.

Taking the increase in the number of schools in the upper provinces, we find that at Assiout the number has risen, in twelve years, from 283 to 689; at Esneh, from 130 to 341; and at Keneh, from 113 to 424. The respective number of teachers has also increased in like proportion.

Although the progress of education in the country has not been rapid, the above statistics are by no means discouraging.

The education of children is not compulsory on the parents. The teachers in the schools are not paid by the Government, but receive a small sum from each pupil. The increase in the number of schools and teachers, therefore, denotes an increase of desire, on the part of the fellah, to obtain instruction for his children.

In addition to these elementary schools there are at present about seventeen schools

scattered in the different Moudirichs which are supported by the Administration of the Wakfs. It is estimated by Yacoub Artin Pasha that about 2,000 pupils annually attend them.

In the chief villages, again, the more wealthy cultivator is generally careful to give instruction to his own children and those of his dependents, by engaging the services of some poor student of the El-Azhar Mosque, who, like the other village teachers, adds to his small income by filling the duties of public scribe to the community.

The method of tuition in the villages is uniform throughout the country. It consists of making a child learn passages from the Koran by heart, at the same time instructing him in the alphabet and in writing until he is able to read and write the passages which have already been impressed on his memory. The one universal book from which all rudimentary instruction is received is the Koran, and thus the language learnt by each succeeding generation remains pure and unaltered.

Reform and improvement in the education of the mass of the population requires long and careful consideration. The reforms which Ismail Pasha endeavoured to introduce, at great expense, all met with failure from the hasty manner in which he insisted on their being carried out. Yacoub Artin Pasha is labouring patiently to bring about improvements adapted to the condition and character of the Egyptian people. He is doing good service by the publication in his Department of cheap books and pamphlets, which find their way into the remotest villages, and prevent the fellah from forgetting, by want of practice, the little learning he has acquired in his childhood.

Conclusion.

In the above narrative of the progress made during the last few years in the welfare of the agricultural population, the broad outlines of reform have alone been shown. All the minor details which serve to give the whole work both strength and substance have been omitted. It would, however, have been difficult to enumerate all the lesser measures passed in the various Departments under English control. The Financial Department, more especially, has undergone thorough reform in all its branches. A system of supervision has been instituted, which has necessarily put a stop to all arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the smaller officials in the provinces. All this has contributed, to a great extent, to do away with former malpractices.

It would, however, be too much to say that bribery and corruption have entirely disappeared. Among the officials connected with the native Law Courts venality is, according to independent accounts, as prevalent as ever, and the fellahen complain (with cause) that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor.

But with the system of bribery so ingrained in the habits of the people, it is satisfactory to learn that a great improvement has taken place in this direction in the other branches of the Administration. According to the statement of an irrigation officer who is well acquainted with the country, and who is constantly travelling in the provinces, no bribe has ever been offered to an English engineer to induce him to distribute water with it more partially to one than to another.

The reports of men most competent to judge of the present condition of the agricultural population all tend to affirm that the lot of the fellah has been greatly ameliorated in the last few years. He is, according to their accounts, better fed and better clothed. He no longer has to dread the courbash, nor has he such reason to fear the corvée or the military conscription. He knows the amount of taxes he has to pay, and the time at which they will be demanded from him. He has been enabled, to a great extent, to free himself from the usurer. He is, in fact, gradually emerging from the oppression and misery in which he had been plunged from time immemorial.

A great deal of this has been accomplished since the British occupation of the country. The reforms introduced under English influence are the more noteworthy, when it is considered that the first years of our occupation were taken up with military events which naturally diverted the attention of the Government from the internal affairs of the country, and that the year 1884 was marked by unusual depression in trade owing to the heavy fall in the price of cereals. The financial difficulties of that year were also so great that at two distinct periods "the Egyptian Treasury was within 5,000*l.* of suspending payment."*

It is thus, practically, but three years that the work of reform has been going on.

Many other beneficial measures are either on the point of being passed, or are receiving the earnest consideration of the Egyptian Government.

(Signed) F. S. CLARKE.

Cairo, June 2, 1888.

* Sir E. Vincent's Report in 1884.

No. 66.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 214. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 3, 1888.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I have the honour to report that the messenger who will go to Khartoun leaves Cairo on the 4th. He takes money for the prisoners, including 100*l.* for Lupton Bey. I have the honour to inclose a *fac-simile* of the letter he will take from Sir Francis Grenfell to Lupton Bey. This letter will be sewn in the inside of his clothes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING

Inclosure in No. 66.

General Grenfell to Lupton Bey.

ALL your family are well, and anxiously await news from you; if possible, let us know full amount of money you have received up to this time.

(Signed) F. GRENFELL, *Sirdar.*

May 30, 1888.

No. 67.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 11, 1888, 2.30 P.M.

YOUR telegram of 9th instant.

Your language approved.

No. 68.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 13, 11 A.M.)

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 13, 1888.

THE messenger sent to Lupton some while ago has arrived at Korosko with letters from him and receipts for 286*l.*

No. 69.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 16, 11.5 P.M.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 16, 1888, 6.12 P.M.

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 85 of 13th instant, and Mr. Barrington's Private one of the same date.

I propose leaving by the most direct route as soon as I have attended to the bags brought by the messenger due next Monday.

The Sultan having appointed previously yesterday for seeing me, I took this opportunity of informing His Imperial Majesty of my intended short absence on private grounds, assuring His Imperial Majesty that I would be back very soon. The Sultan alluded to the Egyptian question in a way that showed that it was again disquieting him. He said he had received telegraphic positive assurances from Moukhtar Pasha that the latter had nothing to do with the recent Ministerial crisis in Cairo, as had been stated in the "Times." But His Imperial Majesty pressed me to make some suggestion as to a resumption of negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and himself on the subject of Egypt, and asked me to say whether I was acquainted with any difficulty in the way of its prompt solution. I felt that

this was treading on dangerous ground, and that it was my duty not to allow His Imperial Majesty to indulge in dangerous illusions, which would be sure to be worked upon during my short absence. I therefore frankly made a reference to the way in which the ratification of Sir H. Wolff's Convention had been refused. This allusion evidently produced a deep and painful impression on His Imperial Majesty, and I had to promise him to submit his wishes to your Lordship; but he was not satisfied even with this, and tried to induce me to ask for authority to open negotiations and bring them to a rapid conclusion before my departure, which I said was impossible.

No. 70.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 19.)

Sir,

Admiralty, June 16, 1888.

I AM commanded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the perusal of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the commanding officer of Her Majesty's ship "Dolphin," dated the 15th May, relative to the state of affairs at Suakin.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Commander Neville to Admiral His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh.

Sir,

"Dolphin," at Suakin, May 15, 1888.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Royal Highness that since my last general letter, dated the 2nd May, 1888, the following have been the movements of Her Majesty's ships:—

On the 12th instant we observed a large body of the rebel cavalry marching towards the sea, about six miles to the northward. Near the beach was a dhow suspiciously laying off and on; so I ordered the "Albacore" to slip and proceed at once (she having steam for working the electric light).

The dhow turned out to be a small fishing-boat doing no harm; by the time the "Albacore" had got to the spot the rebels had all disappeared. From information received from deserters, it appears that it was Osman Digna and Abu Girgeh with a large escort going to bathe.

Numbers of deserters come in every day; sixteen came to this ship yesterday; they report that food is very scarce in the rebel camp. They also report that their whole force turned out on Friday, the 11th instant, and marched towards Suakin, with the intention of attacking, but at the last moment the "Emirs" refused to go to certain death. I don't think there is the least chance of any attack being made.

2. This ship goes out to-day to fire a portion of the quarterly ammunition, remaining at sea for the night firing, and the machine-gun firing to-morrow; on her return the "Albacore" will cruise to the southward, where I hear it is likely they may fall in with some slaves. She will return on the 23rd, in order to be here to celebrate Her Majesty's birthday.

3. Mr. Cameron, British Consul, is going on leave by this mail, and has requested me to act for him until the arrival of his successor, which I hope will be in a month's time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. NEVILLE.

No. 71.

Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 240. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 16, 1888.

THE Sultan, having noticed my presence on the occasion of the Court Function on the first day of Bairam on the 10th instant, sent me a message through

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Munir Pasha, the Grand Master of Ceremonies, expressing a desire to see me after the "selamlık," or procession to the mosque on the following Friday.

This being yesterday, I presented myself on the occasion, and had the honour of being received at an audience of which Sir Alfred Sandison drew up an account at my request, which he submitted to Munir Pasha, so as to make sure that His Imperial Majesty's words to me concerning Egypt were accurately rendered.

I have the honour to forward to your Lordship a copy of this account in French, as Munir Pasha, who is the Chief Imperial Interpreter, does not know English.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. A. WHITE.

Inclosure in No. 71.

Résumé by Sir A. Sandison of Sir W. White's Audience with His Majesty the Sultan,
June 15, 1888.

(Confidential.)

SA Majesté Impériale le Sultan aborda la question Égyptienne en disant qu'elle avait reçu la veille un télégramme de Moukhtar Pacha concernant la crise et le changement de Ministère en Égypte, et dans lequel son Excellence donnait des assurances positives comme quoi il n'y était pour rien dans le changement, malgré les assertions du correspondant du "Times." Sa Majesté Impériale observa à ce propos qu'en effet, en présence des assurances de Moukhtar Pacha, dont le mandat était défini, elle avait tout lieu de croire que son Excellence ne s'en était point mêlé, et que d'ailleurs il s'agissait là d'une question qui lui était indifférente et que dès lors la formation de tout Ministère qui avait l'approbation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique aurait également la sienne.

Sa Majesté Impériale fit ressortir ensuite les raisons pour lesquelles il ne cessait pas de se préoccuper continuellement de la question Égyptienne, qui, ne pouvant pas rester ainsi en suspens, demandait une solution de nature à alléger le fardeau qui pesait sur elle comme Souverain. Que tout autant que la question resterait indéfinie et en suspens une pareille situation ne saurait être qu'une cause permanente de soucis et d'anxiété pour Sa Majesté Impériale, et que par conséquent une solution ou arrangement, destiné à satisfaire tant l'Angleterre que la Turquie, était sincèrement à souhaiter, d'autant plus qu'une telle solution tendrait en même temps à raffermir et à consolider les relations existant entre les deux pays.

Dans ces vues Sa Majesté Impériale demanda alors à savoir de l'Ambassadeur si à sa connaissance il existait d'obstacles qui s'opposaient à un arrangement amical.

En réponse, son Excellence s'est trouvé dans la nécessité de soumettre au Sultan qu'une Convention ratifiée par Sa Majesté la Reine, Impératrice des Indes, ayant été rejetée par Sa Majesté Impériale, il n'était pas d'habitude de reprendre des négociations de ce genre.

Sa Majesté Impériale, après avoir exprimé ses regrets au sujet de cette réponse et s'être étendue sur la question, ajouta que son Gouvernement n'avait pas fait d'objections sur l'ensemble de la Convention, mais qu'il voulait simplement obtenir certaines petites modifications, qui répondraient aux vœux de l'opinion publique en Turquie. Sa Majesté ajouta que, s'il s'agissait d'une faute commise par un Grand Vizir, le remède serait simple en le changeant, tandis qu'il n'en était pas de même d'un Souverain. Qu'en expliquant tout cela à Lord Salisbury il demandait son concours, et qu'ayant constaté tout d'abord que le Gouvernement Anglais voulait bien montrer quelques bonnes dispositions, Sa Majesté Impériale s'en trouve privée aujourd'hui. Le Sultan demanda ensuite à l'Ambassadeur s'il n'y aurait pas possibilité pour son Excellence de remettre son départ pour très peu de temps et chercher à arrêter un arrangement dans le sens désiré et avoir ainsi la satisfaction de remettre en personne au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine une solution de cette question, dans laquelle Sa Majesté Impériale ne cherchait qu'une issue ou porte de sortie en présence de la difficulté où elle se trouvait à cause de cette question et de l'embarras qu'elle avait vis-à-vis de son peuple.

Dans le courant de la conversation l'Ambassadeur a également eu l'honneur de dire à Sa Majesté Impériale qu'il rapportera la conversation de l'audience au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, et que s'il y a une réponse, il la soumettra à son retour à Sa Majesté Impériale.

(Signé) A. SANDISON.

No. 72.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 227.)

Cairo, June 12, 1888.

My Lord,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 209, Secret of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that in the course of conversation a few days ago, Count d'Aubigny informed me that he had induced his Government to give their consent to the Decree relating to the creation of a reserve fund.

Count d'Aubigny added that the Decree had been strongly opposed by M. de Blignières.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

No. 73.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 228.)

Cairo, June 13, 1888.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an extract from the "Journal Officiel" of to-day, giving copy of the letter addressed by the Khedive to Riaz Pasha, and of Riaz Pasha's reply.

I also inclose copy of the Decree appointing the new Ministers.

Mohamed Zeki Pasha and Mustapha Fehmy Pasha were members of Nubar Pasha's Cabinet.

Ali Moubarek Pasha was formerly Minister of Public Works, and Hussein Fakry Pasha, Minister of Justice, under the presidency of the late Chérif Pasha.

Zoufkar Pasha was, until recently, Master of the Ceremonies to His Highness the Khedive.

There was at one time a question of appointing Omar Pasha Lufti to be Minister of War, but eventually it was decided to leave the present Minister, Mustapha Pasha Fehmy, in charge of the War Department.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 73.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of June 13, 1888.

SON Altesse le Khédive a adressé à son Excellence Riaz Pacha la lettre suivante :—

"Mon cher Riaz Pacha, "Alexandrie, Palais de Ras-el-Tin, le 9 Juin, 1888.

"Je m'adresse à votre patriotisme, autant qu'à votre dévouement envers moi, pour vous prier d'accepter la mission de former un nouveau Cabinet.

"Dans les importantes et hautes fonctions que je vous appelle à remplir, soyez assuré que mon loyal appui ne vous fera jamais défaut. J'ajouterai que le programme contenu dans mon Rescrit du 21 Septembre, 1879, est celui-là même que je veux toujours suivre. J'ai à peine besoin de vous en rappeler les points principaux :

"Gouverner avec et par mon Conseil des Ministres ;

"Remettre entre vos mains la Présidence du Conseil, tout en me réservant d'assister à ses réunions et de le présider moi-même toutes les fois que je le jugerai nécessaire ;

"Faire prédominer dans l'Administration du pays les idées d'honnêteté, de progrès, d'ordre, et d'économie ;

"S'efforcer, enfin, d'assurer la prospérité morale et matérielle de l'Égypte.

"Tel est le but à atteindre et auquel j'espère parvenir, grâce à votre collaboration, et je compte entièrement, à ce sujet, sur le tact, l'énergie, l'activité et le zèle dont vous m'avez déjà donné tant de preuves.

"Croyez, &c.
(Signé) "MÉHÉMET TEWFIK."

Son Excellence Riaz Pacha a répondu en ces termes à l'appel de Son Altesse le Khédive :—

“ Monseigneur,

“ *Alexandrie, le 10 Juin, 1888.*

“ Votre Altesse a daigné me charger de former un Cabinet.

“ Je remercie votre Altesse de ce nouveau témoignage de haute confiance. Je la remercie en même temps d'avoir bien voulu compter sur mon dévouement envers elle et sur mon patriotisme.

“ Mon plus vif désir est de répondre à cette confiance et de contribuer dans la limite de mes forces et avec le concours de mes collègues, à l'application des principes qu'elle a affirmés comme base de son Gouvernement.

“ C'est dans cette pensée que j'ai l'honneur de soumettre à votre Altesse, pour la formation du nouveau Cabinet, les noms suivants :—

“ Son Excellence Moustapha Fehmy Pacha, Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine.

“ Son Excellence Zoulikar Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ;

“ Son Excellence Mohamed Zeki Pacha, Ministre des Travaux Publics ;

“ Son Excellence Hussein Fakhry Pacha, Ministre de la Justice ;

“ Son Excellence Aly Moubarek Pacha, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique.

“ Si votre Altesse daigne approuver ces nominations, je la prie de vouloir bien les sanctionner et me confier les portefeuilles de l'Intérieur et des Finances, comme elle m'a confié la Présidence du Conseil.

“ Je suis, &c.
(Signé) “ RIAZ.”

“ Inclosure 2 in No. 73.

Extract from the “ Journal Officiel ” of June 13, 1888.

Décret.

NOT S, Khédive d'Égypte,

Vu notre Rescrit du 21 Septembre, 1879.

Sur la proposition du Président de notre Conseil des Ministres.

Décrétons :

Article 1^{er}.—Sont nommés :

Leurs Excellences Riaz Pacha, Ministre de l'Intérieur et des Finances ; Moustafa Fehmy Pacha, Ministre de la Guerre et de la Marine ;

Son Excellence Zoulikar Pacha, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ;

Son Excellence Mohamed Zeki Pacha, Ministre des Travaux Publics ;

Son Excellence Hussein Fakhry Pacha, Ministre de la Justice ;

Son Excellence Aly Moubarek Pacha, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique.

Art. 2.—Notre Président du Conseil est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret. Fait au Palais de Ras-el-Tin, le 11 Juin, 1888 (2 Chawak, 1305).

(Signé) VÉHÉMET TEWFIK.

Par le Khédive :

Le Président du Conseil des Ministres,

(Signé) RIAZ.

No. 74.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 229. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 13, 1888.

THE fall of Nubar Pasha and the accession to office of Riaz Pasha has naturally given rise to much comment here, most of which is of very little value or importance. One idea, which was started by Mr. Moberly Bell, the “Times” correspondent, is, that Moukhtar Pasha was privy to Nubar Pasha's fall, and, in fact, brought it about. This is the view which is circulated by Nubar Pasha's personal following. I should not

have thought it worth while to mention the subject to your Lordship had not both the Khedive and Riaz Pasha spoken to me about it.

His Highness told me that Moukhtar Pasha was quite ignorant of the intended change of Ministry, and I have no doubt whatever that this statement is strictly accurate. In fact, to any one who knows the Khedive's real sentiments as regards Turkish interference, the idea that Moukhtar Pasha was instrumental in bringing about Nubar Pasha's fall is quite ludicrous. The Khedive is extremely jealous of any interference on the part of Moukhtar Pasha, and, probably, if the latter had advised him to change his Ministers, it would have been quite sufficient to have prevented His Highness from doing so.

The Khedive, in conversation with me, stated that Moukhtar Pasha was, without doubt, pleased at the change. He preferred a Mahomedan and Turkish to an Armenian and Christian Prime Minister, and he expected that the accession to office of Riaz Pasha would constitute a step towards enhancing the influence of the Porte in Egypt: “Dans lequel,” His Highness said, “Il se trompe joliment, car Riaz Pacha n'est pas plus Turc que moi; il est avant tout Égyptien.”

Riaz Pasha also complained to me bitterly of the statements made in the “Times” about him, to the effect that he was “a creature of Moukhtar Pasha's,” or something of that sort, as reported in a Havas telegram, which, however, is very possibly incorrect.

The view to which I have alluded above does not in any way represent the general opinion of the public here, whether European or native. It is entertained by the “Times” correspondent, but not, so far as I am aware, by any one else. I inclose an extract from the Egyptian Gazette, which, I think, more accurately represents the view generally received.

There can be no doubt that the change of Ministers is popular. For one reason or another Nubar Pasha had alienated from himself the sympathies of almost every class of society. I dwelt at considerable length on the causes of his unpopularity in my despatch No. 562 of the 11th December, 1887, and I need not now repeat what I then said.

The real causes of Nubar Pasha's fall are simple enough. Until last June I gave him a strong personal support. At that time his attitude changed. He attacked me and the English Administration generally, and it was quite clear that he had no intention of working loyally the present complicated system under which Egypt is governed. Although, therefore, I did nothing to bring about Nubar Pasha's fall, I did not think that I was called upon to give him the same active personal support as heretofore. For a time this did not appear to make much difference in his position, and if he had managed to keep on good terms with the Khedive he might have remained in office for some while. But he was sure to quarrel with the Khedive sooner or later, and when the quarrel came, the Khedive, in the absence of any support from me, was sure to dismiss him.

The Khedive was much annoyed with Nubar Pasha for having induced him to send Tigrane Pasha to London. From that moment they got on bad terms, and the dismissal from office of Nubar Pasha was merely a matter of time and opportunity.

There are some here who think that Riaz Pasha's Ministry will not last, as he will not be able to adapt himself to the new order of things in Egypt.

I do not, however, see any particular reason for prognosticating a short term of office to his Ministry. The Khedive will probably wish to keep him for the present at all events. He will stay in office himself. I propose to give him every proper and reasonable support, as I think your Lordship would wish me to do. Under these circumstances I see no particular reason why his Ministry should not last for some while.

I should add that the change now effected is, I should think, of purely local importance. The French have for a long time been eager to bring it about under the impression that it may benefit them, in which I think it not improbable that they may be mistaken. But a further change, which would probably result in bringing Mustapha Pasha Fehmy to the head of affairs, although it would have some local advantage, might not improbably cause some friction with the French Government, who would regard it as the precursor of an increase of English influence in Egypt.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 74.

Extract from the "Egyptian Gazette" of June 12, 1888.

IN criticising the composition of the new Egyptian Cabinet we venture to think our London contemporaries are jumping too rapidly to conclusions which, we sincerely trust, the course of events may prove to be based on incorrect premises.

We will say nothing of the Nubar Ministry except that it began with very fair promises and ended in complete disappointment, for we do not suppose we will find any one in Egypt bold enough to say that Nubar's policy for nearly a year past has been such as was consistent with the best interests of the country.

The Riaz Ministry begins apparently in a different manner—let us hope that this may be of good augury; before it has actually settled down to work it is assailed and its chief is accused of being a creature of Moukhtar Pasha. Now, we have watched Riaz Pasha's career for years, both in and out of office, and we cannot imagine him ever becoming the creature of any person. On the contrary, the danger lies entirely the other way. The independence of character of the Khedive's present Premier is so great that it requires the utmost possible tact to lead him, while to drive him would simply prove an impossibility. And yet we are inclined to think that Riaz Pasha realizes more than any one the great changes that have taken place in the position of his country since he was last in office, and is perfectly willing to concede the principle that British policy must be supreme in Egypt. He certainly is not likely to lean on Turkey or allow any encroachment on the rights secured to Egypt by Firmans and Treaties, so that on this head we may be perfectly assured.

Our London contemporaries will do far more to further the objects of British policy in Egypt by extending a sympathetic support to Riaz Pasha instead of going out of their way to abuse him unnecessarily. The Ministry is a thoroughly Egyptian one, and may prove more capable than any of its predecessors of establishing a firm and stable Administration. For this reason, if for no other, it deserves a fair trial, and we trust that the sense of English fair play may lead our London contemporaries to suspend their judgment until they see it fairly at work. Until then let us look on the bright side of things and believe in the loyalty and uprightness of purpose of the eminent statesman to whom the Khedive has been pleased to intrust the reins of power.

No. 75.

Sir E. Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 232. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 14, 1888.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 214, Confidential, of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a Memorandum by General Sir F. Grenfell, showing the sums of money and the terms of the letter taken to Lupton Bey and other prisoners in Khartoum by the messenger who left Cairo on the 5th June.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. BARING.

Inclosure in No. 75.

*Major-General Grenfell to Sir E. Baring.**Head-Quarters, Egyptian Army, Cairo, June 12, 1888.*

SALEH ROJALI, the Arab engaged to take money to prisoners in Khartoum, left Cairo on the 5th June.

He took with him 100l. each for Lupton Bey, Ibrahim Fouzy, and Victoria Georgi, and the following letter to Lupton Bey:—

"Your friends all well, and anxious to hear from you. I send you 100l. Let me know what money you have received up to date.

(Signed) "F. GRENFELL, Sirdar.

"June 2, 1888."

Three small slips of paper were written on to this effect, and Saleh stated that he could get them into Khartoum without difficulty.

(Signed) F. GRENFELL, Sirdar.

No. 76.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 139.)

Foreign Office, June 25, 1888.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 212 of the 2nd instant, inclosing a Memorandum drawn up by Mr. Clarke upon the condition, past and present, of the agricultural population of Egypt.

I have to request that you will convey to that gentleman my appreciation of the industry and ability shown by him in the preparation of this interesting Report, which will be laid before Parliament.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

No. 77.

The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Baring.

(No. 140.)

Foreign Office, June 28, 1888.

Sir,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatch No. 226 of the 9th June reporting a conversation with the Khedive upon the subject of the late change of Ministry in Egypt.

Your language to His Highness on this occasion is approved by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY.

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